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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this study is to give a survey of both the theory and 
practice concerning LDC exehange rate arrangements. In 1973 the last 
stage of the gold exehange Standard of Bretton Woods, the system of 
fixed parities, ceased to exist. This implied that it was no longer 
possible for an individual country to fix its exehange rate complete-
ly, i.e. to maintain fixed rates expressed in all other eurrencies. As 
Branson and Katseli (1981-b) put it: "Thus in the system begun in the 
early 1970s 'the very concept of a fixed exehange rate is unclear" 
(p.D. 
The monetary authorities can now choose between a number of new forms 
of exehange rate policy. It turned out that most of the developed 
countries preferred independently floating exehange rates or a cooper-
ative exehange arrangement (Snake, EMS). Among LDCs these alternatives 
proved not to be very attractive and most of these countries pegged 
their currency to a single (key) currency or to a currency basket. 
In section 2 we will review the different forms of exehange arrange-
ments after 1973. This will be foliowed, in section 3, by an analysis 
of the theoretical arguments concerning the choice of an exehange rate 
regime. We will not deal with the question of what exehange rate 
regime, if adopted on a world-wide seale, would provide the greatest 
benefits. For a single country, the exehange rate policy of other 
countries is considered as given. This assumption is certainly a 
realistie one for LDCs. Each LDC must select its own exehange rate 
policy given the prevailing global system, which can be characterized 
as generalized floating for the present. 
We have also abstracted from the variety of trade and exehange res-
trictions in LDCs. The result of these restrictions will generally be 
that the actual impact of an exehange rate regime on the domestic 
economy will be less than we would expect on purely theoretical 
grounds. However, this does not imply that economie theory is not of 
use in the process of selecting an exehange rate regime. On the con-
trary, restrictions may become less neeessary, or even redundant, 
under a well-selected exehange arrangement. 
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An increasing number of LDCs peg their currency to a currency basket. 
Within the category of currency basket pegs, the share of SDR pegs 
remains moderate. Most LDCs prefer to compile an individual basket 
instead of using the SDR as a Standard for their exchange rates. This 
is why we put so much emphasis on the composition of an 'optimal' 
currency basket in section 4. In that section we will present a survey 
of the ever-growing literature on this subject. 
The final section contains a summary and conclusions. 
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2. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AFTER 1973 
2.1 The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 
During the Bretton Woods era there were in general only two kinds of 
exchange rate policy possible. A country could either peg its currency 
to the goldr-backed dollar and thereby to all other currencies, or it 
could decide to float against the bloc of other currencies. Very few 
countries opted for the latter alternativel). 
After the 1940s during which a number of currencies devalued against 
the dollar, a period of relatively stable exchange rates began. In 
general we can say that interest in exchange rate theory and policy 
was relatively low in those years. According to the Articles of Agree-
ment of the IMF, the rates could only be changed in the case of a 
'fundamental disequilibrium', a concept that was not further speci-
fied. In the case of a balance of payments deficit the Fund preferred ! 
measures of internal adjustment to exchange rate changes. However, \ 
especially LDCs could not always avoid exchange rate adjustments, 
which gave rise to the opinion that they should be looked upon as 'the 
poor man's means of adjustment' [Södersten (1981, p. 444)]. 
At thé end of the 1960's it became clear that certain currencies were 
over(under) valued. Together with some other factors, of which the 
lack of confidence in the dollar was the most important one, this led j 
to the gradual decline of the gold exchange Standard in the years [ 
between 1968 and 1973. 
In March 1973 the monetary authorities in Europe agreed to cease their 
systematic dollar interventions at the maximum fluctuation margins. 
They tried to keep their currencies together by the so-called Snake 
arrangement. However, it turned out that only the deutsche mark, the 
Netherlands guilder and the Belgium/Luxemburg franc were relatively 
stable in terms of each other. The other currencies entered and left 
the arrangement, sometimes even more than once. 
1) The Canadian dollar had a floating rate from October 1950 till 
May 1962. The Libanon pound, the Mexican peso, the Thai baht and 
the Philippine peso also floated for some time, Cf. Yeager (1976, 
pp. 220, 543-565) and Crockett and Nsouli (1977, p. 127). 
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The exchange rate system prevailing since 1973 is often described as 
generalized floating, because the main currencies are floating in 
relation to each other. However, this does not mean that all cur-
rencies are floating since that time. In fact, most of the world's 
currencies and a vast majority of currencies of LDCs are tied to some 
sort of Standard (see Tables 2-A/F). However, an important difference 
with the situation before 1973 is that nowadays countries must choose 
their exchange rate policy against a background of floating rates. Thé 
rates between the principal currencies (U.S. dollar, yen, deutsche 
mark and pound sterling) have been very volatile since 1973. Mainly in 
order to mitigate the effects of these fluctuations on the domestic 
economy, new forms of exchange rate policy became popular, in particu-
lar among developing countries. 
2.2 New alternatives 
In a world of floating rates there are three basically different ways 
to fix the exchange rate. 
1. pegging to a single currency (single currency Standard); 
2. pegging to more than one currency simultaneously (or a 
multiple currency Standard); 
3. pegging to a composite currency (currency basket Stan-
dard); 
The word Standard refers to the kind of exchange rate policy that is 
being carried out^). Under a single exchange Standard the domestic 
currency is pegged to a Standard currency and it floats against all 
other currencies (with the exception of those currencies that are 
pegged to the same Standard currency). 
2) In the past the word Standard meant a fixed measure for determi-
ning the value of goods and services. The Standard consisted most-
ly of a fixed quantity of a certain commodity (precious metal), in 
which case we speak about a commodity Standard. Just as there are 
three different kinds of exchange standards, we can make a similar 
distinction between the three basic forms of a commodity Standard: 
the single commodity Standard (e.g. the gold Standard), the mul-
tiple commodity Standard (e.g. bimetallism) and the composite 
commodity Standard, as e.g. proposed by Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen 
for UNCTAD 1964 [For a description, see Johnson (1967, pp. 22"9-
236)]. This shows that both exchange and commodity standards can be 
divided according to the same principle: 
pegging to one currency/commodity, pegging to more than one cur-
rency/ commodity and pegging to a composite currency/commodity. 
5 
A somewhat different situation exists in the case of a multiple cur-
rency Standard. Here, the domestic currency is pegged to different 
currencies at the same time. This is only possible when all the cur-
rencies involved are . mutually pegged to each other. An arrangement 
according to which a group of currencies is connected by a system of 
bilateral parities is also called a cooperative exchange rate arrange-
ment. A well-known example of such an arrangement is the EMS. 
The third type of Standard is only relevant in a sltuation of floating 
rates. Under fixed rates maintaining a currency basket Standard makes 
no sense, since the value of the basket in terms of the basket cur-
rencies- is stable in that case. We should keep in mind that pegging to 
a basket is equivalent to stabillzing an effective exchange rate. We 
will come back to this later, when we analyze the composition of 
currency baskets. Within the class of currency basket standards we can 
make a further subdivision into ind.ividual basket Standard and offi-
cial basket standards. In the first case the composition of the basket 
is determined by an individual country according to its own preferen-
ces,' while in the second case an official basket, compiled by an 
international organisation, is used. Examples of official baskets are 
the SDR and the ECU. 
The, three basic forms which we have described above refer to the 
character of the peg. Apart from the character, another important 
aspect is the rigidity of the peg. In order of decreasing rigidity, 
we can make a distinction between: 
1 . complete fixat.ion; 
2. limited flex-ibility; 
3. managed floating; 
4. independent or free floating; 
However, we must keep in mind that the borderlines between the diffe-
rent categories are hard to establish. 
All three forms of exchange rate pegging can go together with these 
degrees of fixation. It is obvious, however, that in the case of 
completely independent floating we can no longer speak of an exchange 
Standard being maintained. 
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When we now compare the situation before 1973 with the one after 1973 
we may conclude that there has been an extension both in the character 
and in the rigidity of exchange rate arrangements. Before 1973 there 
existed only one possible kind of peg, i.e. a peg to the key currency 
(dollar), and the rigidity of this peg was prescribed by the IMF 
Articles of Agreement (margins of 1 per cent around the dollar pa-
rit.y). The only other possible exchange rate policies were raanaged or 
independent floating against the bloc of other currencies. 
After 1973 new forms of exchange rate policy became possible, such as 
cooperative exchange rate arrangements and currency basket standards. 
The possibilities of varying the rigidity of a peg were widened as 
well (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 Classification of exchange rate regimes 
Before 1973, under the system 
of Bretton Woods 
After 1973» under generalized 
floating 
kind of fixation 
1. pegging to the key currency 
(dollar) or gold 
kind of fixation 
1. pegging to a single currency 
2. joining an exchange rate ar-
rangement 
3.a. pegging to an official 
basket 
3.b. pegging to an individual 
basket 
rigidity of fixation 
1. margins of 1 percent around 
the official parity* 
rigidity of fixation 
'1. fixation with very narrow mar-
gins 
2. managed floating against 
the bloc of other curren-
cies 
2. limited flexibility 
3. managed floating 
3. independent floating against 
the bloc of other currencies 4. independent floating 
* After a short period of floating the margins were widened to 2.25$ 
by the Smithsonian Agreement that was signed in Washington in 
December 1971 . 
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2.3 Recent developments and the present situation 
In the preceding section we discussed the various possible exchange 
rate regimes in a world of generalized floating. But how important are 
these regimes in real life and what developments have taken place 
since 1973? 
'In Tables 2-A/F an overview of exchange rate arrangements of IMF 
member countries is presented for the period 1973—1983• In Tables 2-
A/B all countries are classified, while in Tables 2-C/D and 2-E/F we 
have made a further distinction between LDCs and industrial countries 
respectively3). 
In order to give an idea of the importance of the different exchange 
arrangements two measures can be used. 
The first one is the number of countries that maintain a certain 
exchange Standard1*). We have used this measure in the Tables 2-
A/C/E. However, this measure has two serious drawbacks. It does not 
make any distinction between the size of countries, nor does it take 
account of the fact that in the period under examination a considera-
ble number of small LDCs joined the IMF. This is the reason why we 
have introduced another measure for analyzing developments in the use 
of exchange arrangements. 
3) We have adopted the classification described in IMF-World Economie 
Outlook 1983, PP. 168-69. 
4) See e.g. recent issues of IMF International Financial Statistics 
(Table of Exchange Arrangements) and issues of IMF Exchange Arran-
gements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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TABLE 2-A Exchange arrangements of IMF member countries 1973~1983 (end of year) (number of countries) 
Exchange arrangement 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 , 1979 
Single currency pegs 96 92 78 70 73 61 b2 
1980 1981 
of which: SDR 
individual baskets 6 
Cooperative exchange 
13 
9 
18 
12 
18 
13 
17 
Vb 
21 
15 
2Ü 
15 
of which: iimited flexibiltty in terms of a single currency** 
adjusted according to a set of indicators 
other managed floating 
independent floating 
15 
23 
1982 
57 
15 
23 
1983 
52 
of which: U.S. dollar 68 65 52 f* 5U '13 'ij '< I 12 39 3't 
pound sterling 11 10 8 'i 5 'i 1 1 1 1 1 
French franc 16 13 13 '1 11 H 11 '1 11 H '3 
other currencies 1 1 5 .1 'l 3 1 3 1 " '' 
Currency basket pegs 6 IJ 27 30 3£_ __36 35 37 38 38 10_ 
13 
27 
arrangement* 7 6 7 6 5 1 7 7 7 7 7 
Flexible arrangements*** 19 17 15 21 21 31 36 38 10 11 17 
0 9 
5 b 
'1 21 
ü Q 
Total of all countries: 128 128 127 127 132 H8 116 
TABLE 2-B Exchange arrangements of IMF member countries 1973-1983 (end of year) (market shares)*** 
Exchange arrangement 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Single currency pegs 21.2 23.1 15.0 11.2 11.6 9.1 
1979 1980 1981 
7.1 6.1 
of which: SDR 
individual baskets 1.1 
Cooperative exchange 
5.1 
2.8 
8.1 
3.0 
7.1 
1.1 
8.9 
1.5 
8.9 
1.2 
9.7 
1.1 
9.8 
of which: Iimited flexi-
bility in terms 
of a single curr.** 
1982 
5.3 
1.6 
10.1 
7.6 
1983 
A3 
of which: U.S. dollar 19.0 21.3 13.5 13.2 13.5 8.3 7.2 6.5 5.6 1.8 3.9 
pound sterling 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French franc 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
other currencies 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Currency basket pegs 1.1 5 .1 11.2 10.1 10.9 10-3 10.1 10.9 10.8 11.9 11.7 
i . 2 
10.5 
arrangement* 27.0 23.3 30.1 23.2 21 .1 21.0 32.3 29.7 27.9 28.1 28.1 
Flexible arrangements*** 17.1 15.3 11.6 50.1 51.3 51.1 11.7 17.9 52.8 51 .8 52.0 
6.3 
adjusted according 
to a set of indica-
tors 2.5 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 
other managed 
floating 10.8 11.0 
independent 
floating 31.5 32.8 
Total of all countries: 97.1 97.2 97.7 97.7 97.8 97.1 96.6 97.5 99.1 96.3 96.3 
* From 1973 until 1979 this category refers to the Snake arrangement, In later years to the EMS. 
»* In practlce this currency was the U.S. dollar. 
*** The reatcategory TlexiBle arrangements' was split up further In subcategories in 1978 and 1982 as a result of the 
growing lmportance of this group. 
Sources and explanatlon: The data about exchange arrangements were taken from IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Restric-
tlona 1971-1978, IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrlctiona 1979-
1983, and IMF International Financial Statlstica february 1984. 
Included are two non-metropolitan terrltoriea (Hong Kong and the Netherlanda Antillea) for 
which the respective members have accepted the Fund'a Artlcles of Agreement. 
The Belglan-Luxembourg Economie Union (BLEU) ia represented by one aingle entry. 
For one IMF member state. Democratie Kampuchea, there ia no Information about lta exchange rate 
regime. 
For the yeara between 1973 and '981 the comblned market shares are deduced from individual 
market shares as published in the IMF-Internatlonal Financial Statistics/Supplement on Trade 
Statlstica-Supplement Series no. «, 1982. The market shares mentioned in thla publlcation on 
* the pages 10<*-M6 are deTlned as exports expreaaed aa a percentage of world importa. these 
market shares were multlplled by worid importa and dlvlded by world exporta. 8y this procedure 
the market shares in our tables represent exports expreased as a percentage of world exporta. 
For 1982 the market shares were calculated from IMF-Internatlonal Financial Statlstica of 
February 1984 by dlviding country exporta by world exports. For 1983 the market shares of 1982 
were used. 
The market shares do not sum up to 100 per cent because not all countries are IMF raembera. Due 
to roundlng off, totals may dlffer from the sum of individual entries. 
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TABLE 2-C Exchange arrangements of LDCs 1973-1983 (end of year) number of countries)3 
Exchange arrangement 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Single currency pegs 93 91 77 69 72 63 62 59 61 57 52 
of which: U.S. dollar 66 65 52 19 50 13 13 11 12 39 31 
pound sterling 10 9 7 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 
French franc 16 13 13 14 11 11 11 11 11 13 13 
other currencies 1 4 5 H i) 3 1 3 4 4 1 
Currency basket pegs 1 7 22 26 26 31 31 33 31 31 36 
of which: SDR - - 9 12 13 15 15 15 15 15 13 
individual baskets 1 7 13 1H 13 16 . 16 18 19 19 23 
Cooperative exchange 
arrangement* 
- - - - - - - - - - -
Flexible arrangements*** 12 11 9 13 15 25 28 30 32 36 39 
of which: limited flexi-
bility in terms 
of a single curr.2 10 
adjusted according 
to a set of indica-
tors 
other managed 
floating 17 21 
independent 
floating 
Total of all countries: 109 109 108 108 113 119 121 122 127 127 127 
TABLE 2-D Exchange arrangements of LDCs 1973-1983 (end of year) (market ahares') 
Exchange arrangement 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Single currency pegs 17.9 22.8 11.5 13-9 11.2 8.8 7.8 7.1 6.1 5.3 1.5 
of which: U.S. dollar 16.1 21.3 13.5 13.2 13.5 8.3 7.2 6.6 5.6 1.8 3.9 
pound sterling 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French franc 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
other currencies - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Currency basket pegs 0.2 1.0 6.9 7.1 7.1 5.5 5.8 6.6 6.6 7.0 7.5 
of which: SDR - - 2.8 3-0 2.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.2 
individual baskets 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 4.3 4.2 1.3 5.3 5.6 5.5 6.2 
Cooperative exchange 
arrangement* 
- - - - - - - - - - -
Flexible arrangements*** 1.6 5.9 6.9 8.7 9.0 17.2 15.0 18.5 19.6 18.5 19.1 
of which: limited flexi-
bility in terms 
of a single curr.** 7.6 6.3 
adjusted according 
to a set of indica-
tors 2.5 1.1 2.0 1.9 
other managed 
floating 7.6 9.1 
independent 
floating 1.1 1.1 
Total of all countries: 22.8 29.7 28.2 29.7 30.1 31.4 28.6 32.1 32.3 30.8 30.8 
Notes and sources see Table 2-B 
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TABLE 2-E Exchange arrangements of industrial countries 1973~1983 (end of year) (number of countries) 
Exchange arrangement 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Single currency pegs 3 1 ] ] ] ] " Z ~ Z Z__ 
of which: U.S. dollar
 2 _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
pound sterling 1 
French franc 
other currencies 
Currency basket pegs 2 
1 1 1 1 1 
of which: SDR 
individual baskets 2 6 5 1 1 5 
Cooperative exchange 
arrangement* 7 6 17 6 5 1_ 
Flexlble arrangements**** 
of which: limited flexi-
bility in terms 
of a single curr.** 
adjusted acoording 
to a set of indica-
tors 
other managed 
floating 
independent 
floating 
Total of all countries: 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
TABLE 2-F Exchange arrangements of Industrial countries 1973-1983 (end of year) (aarket shares) 
1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Exchange arrangement 
Single currency pegs 
-1^2 0-3 O.M 0.1 0.1 0.5 
1982 1983 
of which: U.S. dollar 2.8 
pound sterling 0.1 
French franc 
other currencies »-
Currency basket pegs 1.2 
0.3 
1.1 
0.1 
1.3 
0.1 
3.0 
0.1 
3.8 
0.5 
1.8 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
of which: SDR -
individual baskets 1.2 1.1 1.3 3.0 3-8 
Cooperative exchange 
arrangement» 27.0 23.3 30.1 23-1 21.1 
1.8 
21 .0 
1.6 1.1 
32.3 29.7 
1.2 
27.9 
1.2 1.3 
28.1 28.1 
Flexible arrangements*»* H2.8 39.5 31.7 11.6 12.1 39.7 31.2 31.3 35.0 32.9 32.9 
of which: limited flexi-
bility in terms 
of a single curr.** 
adjusted according 
to a set of indica-
tors 
other managed 
floating 2.8 1.6 
independent 
floating 30.1 31.1 
Total of all countries: 71.3 67.1 69.5 68.0 67.7 66.0 68.0 65.1 67.1 65.6 65.6 
Notes and sources see Table 2-B 
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In the Tables 2-B/D/F the entries are formed by the combined market 
sharesS) of the countries which conduct a similar exchange rate 
policy. In the period 1973-1983 the combined market share of new IMF 
member countries was relatively small. Therefore, in examining trends 
in exchange rate policy, the bias re'sulting from the introduction of 
new members is much smaller when we use market shares than when we use 
numbers of countries involved. 
Table 3 contains an overview of all exchange arrangements in operation 
at December 31, 1983. 
A few additional remarks may be useful. 
Independent floating does not imply that there is no intervention at 
all, it may be that the monetary authorities, in the case of excessive 
fluctuations or disorderly market conditions, try to smoothen exchange 
rate movements by intervening in the currency markets. However, when 
they start buying and selling at a specified rate we no longer refer 
to this as independent floating. When the central rate is adjusted 
frequently (every day, every week) this is called managed floating. We 
speak of limited flexibility when the margins around the central rate 
are about 2 1/4 per cent. Under a single currency peg the margins are 
zero and in the case of a basket peg, they are very narrow (mostly 
less than 1 per cent)6). 
5) It should be noted that these combined market shares do not reflect 
the importance of a certain Standard currency in world trade. In 
order to obtain a proper indication of the relative importance of a 
currency the trade share of the country that issues the Standard 
currency should at least be included as well. Especially in the 
case of the U.S. dollar, the difference is considerable. 
6) Cf. IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1983, Table 
1, note 1 (p. 8). The rules for classification, which depend, inter 
alia, on the fluctuations margins, may lead to unexpected results. 
E.g. Saoedi Arabia has pegged its currency to the SDR from March 
1975 on [Yeager (1976), p. 608]. However, because the margins were 
relatively wide, at 7.25 per cent, the Saoedi Arabian riyal was 
classified into the rest-category from 1975 until 1981, while it 
was not classified at all in 1982. Nowadays it is classified in the 
category 'limited flexibility' because of its stable relationship 
with the dollar. When the market share of Saoedi Arabia, which is 
about 5 per cent, were to be added to the combined market share of 
countries that maintain an SDR-peg, this would lead to a completely 
different view on the importance of SDR-pegs and basket-pegs in 
general. 
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TABLK i Exchange arrangement;? of tne meafeer eouiilrjea 
U.S. dollar 
single currency pegs 
French 
franc 
other 
currencies 
(As of December 31, 1983)* 
currency basket pegs cooperative 
individual exchange 
Flexible arrangements 
SDR baskets** 
limited adjusted 
arrangement*»* flexibility aecording 
in terms of to a set 
a single of indica-
currency**** tors***** 
other independent 
managed floating 
floating 
LDCs 
Antigua Benin Bhutan Burma Algeria 
& Barbuda Cameroon (Indian Burundi Bangladesh 
Bahamas Central Rupee Guinea Botswana 
Barbados Afrioan Equatorial Guinea- Cape Verde 
Belize Rep. Guinea Bissau China P.R. 
Bolivia Chad (Spanish Iran, Cyprus 
Djibouti Comoros Peseta) I.R. of Fiji 
Dominica Congo Gambia, Jordan Hungary 
Dominican Gabon The Kenya Kuwait 
Rep. Ivory • (Pound Malawi Madagascar 
Egypt Coast Sterling) Rwanda Malaysia 
El Salvador Mali Lesotho Sao Tomé Malta 
Ethiopia Niger (South & Principe Mauritania 
Grenada Senegal African Mauritius 
Guatemala Togo Rand) Seychelles Nepal 
Haiti Upper Swaziland Vanuatu Papua New 
Honduras Volta (South Viet Nam Guinea 
Iraq African Romania 
Lao. P.D. Rep. Rand) Singapore 
Liberia Solomon 
Libya Islands 
Nicaragua Tanzania 
Oman Tunesia 
Panama Zambia 
Paraguay Zimbabwe 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Sierre Leone 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Venezuela 
Yemen Arab. Rep. 
Yemen P.D. Rep. 
Industrlal Countries 
Afghanistan 
Bahrein 
Ghana 
Guyana 
Malidives 
Ostar 
Saudi Arabia 
Thailand 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Portugal 
Somalia 
Argentinia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Greece 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Korea 
Mexico 
Marocoo 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Western 
Samoa 
Yugoslavia 
Zaïre 
l3rael 
Lebanon 
South 
Africa 
Uruguay 
Austria Belgium/Luxembourg 
Finland Denmark 
Norway France 
Sweden Germany 
Fed. rep. of 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Iceland Australia 
New Canada 
Zealand Japan 
Spain United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Excluding the currency of Democratie Kampuchea, for which no current information is avallable. For members with 
dual or multiple exchange markets, the arrangement shown is that in the major market. 
Comprises currencies which are pegged to various baskets of currencies of the members' own choice, as distinct 
from the SDR basket. 
Refers to the cooperative arrangement maintained under the European Monetary System. 
Exchange rates of all currencies have shown limited flexibility in terms of the U.S. dollar. 
***** Includes exchange arrangements under which the exchange rate is adjusted at relatively frequent intervals, on the 
basis of indicators determined by the respective member countries. 
*** 
**** 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, February 1984, p. 15. 
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From Tables 2-A/F and 3 we can draw the fol lowing conc lus ions . 
1. The r o l e of the do l la r has decreased s lowly, e s p e c i a l l y when we 
keep in mind tha t during the systera of Bre t ton Woods a l l currenc-
ies were pegged to the d o l l a r . From 1973 t o 1983 the number of 
count r ies t ha t peg t h e i r currency t o the do l l a r has decreased from 
68 to 31*, while the combined market share of these count r ies 
decl ined even more sharp ly from about 19 per cent to 4 per cen t . 
From 1974 on only LDCs maintained a do l l a r Standard. 
2. The pound s t e r l i n g has almost completely disappeared as a Standard 
currency. Only The Gambia s t i l l pegs i t s currency to the pound. 
Unt i l 1979, when I r e l and entered the EMS, the I r i s h pound was the 
l a s t and only currency of a developed country t h a t was pegged t o 
the pound s t e r l i n g . 
3. Both the number and the combined market share of the count r ies 
tha t peg t h e i r cur renc ies to the French franc have remained s t a b l e 
during the period under examination. I t concerns a group of former 
French co lon i e s , of which 11 coun t r i es use the CFA franc?) as 
t h e i r currency. 
H. A few, very small LDCs have pegged t h e i r currency t o other Stan-
dard cur renc ies as the South-African rand (Lesotho, Swaziland), 
the Indian rupee (Bhutan) and the Spanish pese ta (Equ i to r i a l Guin-
e a ) . In a l l cases i t concerns count r ies t ha t have a s t rong h i s t o r -
i c a l l i n k with the country t h a t i s sues the Standard currency. 
5. When we look a t the t o t a l of s i n g l e currency pegs we must conclude 
t h a t t h i s category l o s t much of i t s appeal a f t e r 1973. The number 
of coun t r i es with a currency pegged to a s i n g l e Standard currency 
went down from 96, which was equivalent to 75 per cent of a l l IMF 
member s t a t e s at t ha t t ime, t o 52, which i s about 35 per cent of 
a l l count r ies at the end of 1983-• The reduc t ion in market shares 
7) The CFA (Communeaute F inanciere Afr ica ine) franc i s pegged to the 
French franc at a r a t e of CFAF 1 = FF 0.02. The CFA franc tha t 
c i r c u l a t e s as the common currency in Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta i s i ssued by the Banque Centra le des 
E ta t s de 1'Afrique de 1'Ouest (BCEAO), s i t u a t e d in Dakar (Senegal) . 
The CFA franc t h a t c i r c u l a t e s in Chad, Cameroon, Centra l African 
Republic , Congo, and Gabon i s issued by the Banque des E ta t s de 
1'Afrique Central (BEAC), s i t u a t e d in Yaoundé (Cameroon). The Mali 
franc has a f ixed r a t e of FF 0.01 or CFA 0 . 5 , while the Comorian 
franc i s f ixed a t FF 0.02 (Source: IMF-Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange R e s t r i c t i o n s 1983 and Lomax (1983)) . 
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was even greater, decreasing from 21 per cent in 1973, to 4 per 
cent ten years later. From 1979 on, only LDCs maintained a single 
currency peg. 
6. The group of currency basket pegs nas gained from the reduction in 
single currency pegs. The SDR made a quick start as a Standard for 
exchange rate policy. In the period 1975~1977, directly after the 
SDR value became based on a currency basket, the number of coun-
tries with a SDR peg grew to 13, while the combined market share of 
these countries amounted to 3 per cent. In later years the number 
of countries that maintain an SDR Standard remained stable around 
14, but their combined trade share was reduced to about 1 per 
cent. Until now only LDCs have pegged their currency to the SDR. 
This last statement does not hold true for other composlte pegs. At 
the moment there are four developed countries that base their 
exchange rate policy on a composite currency. 
Of the centrally planned economies that are member of the IMF, 
Hungary has also pegged its currency to a basket. The number and 
combined market share of LDCs with an individual basket peg show a 
steady growth over the whole period. 
7. From the entries in the row of cooperative exchange arrangements it 
becomes clear once more, that the Snake was not a very solid ex-
change arrangement. The number of participants changed every year. 
Since 1979 when the EMS was set up, this instability has disap-
peared. 
During the period under examination the IMF has refined its classifi-
cation of exchange rate regimes. In 1978 a special category was set up 
for exchange rates that were adjusted to a set of indicators. In 1982 
the category 'limited flexibility to a single currency' was introduced 
for countries that maintained a loose tie between their currency and a 
Standard currency (the dollar). The rest-category of managed and/or 
independent floating was split out into two new categories, i.e. 
'other managed floating' and 'independently floating'. 
This development towards a more detailed classification of flexible 
exchange rate policies reflects the increasing number of countries 
that carry out such a policyS). 
8) Cf. IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1982, p. 
58: 'As such a large undefined residual category was unsatisfac-
tory for classification purposes, a revised and amplified method 
of classification was adopted to reflect the extent and form of 
flexibility that these arrangements permit'. 
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At the end of 1973 19 countries had a more or less floating exchange 
rate, of which 12 were LDCs, while in 1983 47 countries were classi-
fied in the categories 'limited flexibility' and 'floating', of which 
39 were LDCs. It is remarkable that only 4 LDCs have an independently 
floating exchange rate. 
Although the number of countries with a floating exchange rate grew 
fast, the combined market share of this group did not change much over 
the years. Countries with a flexible exchange rate represent about 50 
per cent of world trade. This combined market share mainly consists of 
the market shares of a few very large economies (United States, Japan, 
United Kingdom and Canada). 
We must keep in mind that the classification used in the tables 2-A/F 
is primarily based on the rigidity of a peg. For the category of peg-
ged exchange rates only, a distinction is made between single currency 
pegs and basket pegs. For other categories this distinction is not 
made. A brief explanation may be useful here. 
The category 'limited flexibility' concerns in all cases a relation 
with the dollar. This implies that the role of the dollar as a Stan-
dard currency is more important than would follow from only examining 
the number of countries with a strict dollar peg. 
The same holds true for basket pegs. Apart from the fact that offi-
cially speaking the exchange rate system of the EMS is based on a 
currency basket9), there are quite a few countries with a floating 
rate that use a basket as their exchange Standard. At the end of 1982 
seven countries with a combined market share of about 5 per. cent 
adjusted their exchange rate in relation to a basket of curren-
cieslO). From this we conclude that baskets not only play an impor-
tant role in fixed exchange arrangements, but also in regimes of 
managed floating. 
After these general remarks about the developments in exchange rate 
policy, we now focus our attention more specifically on the diffe-
rences between industrial countries and LDCs in this respect. 
9) Officially all central rates are expressed in ECUs, but in 
practice only bilateral exchange rates play a role. This is why 
the EMS is listed under cooperative exchange arrangements. 
10) These countries were Australia, India, Marocco, New Zealand, 
Nigeria and Western Samoa, all in the category 'adjusted to a set 
of indicators*. Source: IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 1983, country pages. 
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2.H A comparison between LDCs and industrial countries 
First we will make some remarks about exchange rate policy in indus-
trial countries (ICs). With the exception of the changing membership 
of the Snake arrangement there have not been many changes since 1975 
in the exchange rate regimes of ICs. After the start of the EMS in 
1979, only one policy change has taken place. This change concerned 
Australia which altered its exchange rate regime from managed floating 
into independent floating in 1983. 
From TabIe 2-E it beeomes clear that single currency pegs have never 
been very popular among ICs. The only form of pegging that is used by 
ICs nowadays, is that of pegging to a basket. The Skandinavian coun-
tries Finland, Norway and Sweden use individual currency baskets as a 
Standard, while Austria has officially stated that its currency fol-
lows the EMS-currencies11). 
More important in the case of ICs, however, are two other categories 
of exchange rate policy. First there is the EMS, belonging to the ca-
tegory of cooperative exchange arrangements, by which seven currencies 
are linked to each other. These currencies account for approximately 
27 per cent of world trade. Even higher, about 32 per cent, is the 
combined market share of floating currencies. This group consists of 
eight currencies of which five are independently floating. These five 
are the U.S., the Canadian and the Australian dollar, the yen and the 
pound sterling, which accounted for more than 30 per cent of world 
trade in 1983. The three other countries within this group, i.e. 
Iceland, New Zealand and Spain, maintain a managed floating rate. 
LDCs show a completely different pattern as can be seen in Table 2-C. 
First of all the majority of LDCs with either a single currency peg or 
a basket peg has remained fairly stable since 1973. About 90 countries 
11) In IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1983 the 
Austrian exchange rate policy is described in the following way: 
'Without assuming any formal obligations in this respect, the 
authorities aim at maintaining a stable relation with the curren-
cies participating in the EMS' (p. 79). In practice this results 
in a very stable relationship between the Austrian shilling and 
the deutsche mark. 
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fall into this category. From Table 2-D however, it becomes clear that 
the eombined market share of these countries decllned from 23 percent 
in 1974 to about 12 per cent in 1983. This implies that LDCs with a 
large market share have left this category, while LDCs with a smaller 
market share have entered. 
Within the group of pegged currencies there has also been an important 
shift from single currency pegs t'o currency basket pëgs. Mainly as a 
result of the reduction in dollar pegs and the almost complete dis-
appearance of sterling pegs, the number of single currency pegs feil 
down from 93 in 1973 to 52 in 1983. The eombined market share of these 
countries went down from 22 per cent in 1974 to about 4 per cent in 
1983- SDR pegs and other basket pegs gained in popularity. The number 
of LDCs in these two categories grew from 4 in 1973 to 36 in 1983. The 
development in the eombined market share of these countries, however, 
was less pronounced. From 1975 onwards this figure fluctuated around 
6.5 per cent, but since 1978 there has been a slight upward trend. 
The number of LDCs with a floating rate gradually increased from 12 in 
1973 to 39 in 1983, 10 of which belong to the category 'limited flexi-
bility', which was introduced in 198212). In chart 1 we show the 
relative developments in market shares within the group of LDCs. This 
makes clear once more the development from single currency pegs to 
basket pegs and (managed) floating exchange rates. Very few LDCs, 
which are all relatively wealthy (e.g. Israël and South-Africa) have 
an independently floating exchange rate. 
12) Of the 10 LDCs involved here, in 1981 9 belonged to"the category 
'rest of floating' and 1 maintained a basket peg. This implies 
that we can consider the category 'limited flexibility' as a 
further refinement of the rest-category. 
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Chart 1. Exchange rate arrangements of LDCs 1974-1983, relative 
distribution of market shares*) 
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For the end of each year in the period 1973-1983 the oombined 
market share of an exchange rate regime (see Table 2-D) is divided 
by the total market share of all LDCs and expressed as a percen-
tage. E.g. the combined market share of LDCs with a dollar peg on 
December 31, 1975 was 13.5, which represented 48 per cent of the 
total market-share of LDCs (28.2) in that year. Sourees: see Table 
2-B. 
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So far, we have only eompared the situation at different moments in 
time, but we have not yet analyzed the eharacter of the changes that 
took place. In Table 4 the movements between different exchange rate 
regimes in the period 1974-1983 are represented. It becomes clear that 
there have hardly been any changes from one single currency peg to 
another: the only off-diagonal element within this group which is not 
equal to zero, concerns three countries that altered their peg to the 
pound sterling into a U.S. dollar peg. 
TABLE 1 Movements in exchange rate arrangements of LDCs between 1971 and 1983' 
Exchange arrangements As of December 31, 1983 (number of countries) 
adjusted 
U.S. pound French other other according other Not 
As of dollar sterling franc currency SDR composite limited to a set managed independ. classif. 
December 31, 1971 peg peg peg peg peg peg flexib. indicat. floating floating anymore3 Total 
U.S. dollar peg 21 - 7 6 7 1 11 2 1 65 
pound sterling peg 3 1 - 2 1 - 2 - - 9 
French franc peg - - 1 2 - - 1 - - - - - 1 3 
other currency peg _ _ _ j _ , _ _ _ _ - n 
comp. currency peg _ - - - 1 5 _ _ 1 - - 7 
rest of floating _ _ _ - 1 2 - 1 1 2 1 1 1 
not yet classified2 7 - '_} 1 1 6 1 - - ~ I ?0_ 
Total 31 1 13 K 13 23 9 5 21 1 2 129 
1
 Eaeh country is placed in the column of. its exchange rate regime in 1983, and in the row of its exchange rate regime 
in 1971, e.g. seven countries that pegged their currency to the dollar in 1971, maintained an SDR peg in 1983. The 
reason for choosing 1971 instead of 1973 as a base-year is the more detailed classification of exchange rate regimes 
that is available for 1971. 
2
 This row contains LDCs that became a member of the IMF in the period 1971-1983. 
3
 This column contains two LDCs, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Kmer Republic. 
Only 24 of the original 65 countries that maintained a dollar peg in 
1974, continued to do so in 1983. Most of the others went over to a 
floating rate-while 13 pegged their currency to a basket. The growth 
in flexible and floating arrangements results almost entirely from 
countries that were pegged to the dollar at an earlier stage. 
Finally it may be emphasized that at the end of 1983 19 out of the 20 
new IMF members opted for a pegged exchange rate; among these 10 
preferred a currency basket peg. In most cases it concerned very small 
developing countries, which are indeed supposed to be better off with 
a pegged exchange rate, as we shall see in the section 3-
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2.5. Some concluding remarks 
In this section we have analyzed developments in exehange rate policy 
of IMF member states, which we have subdivided into industrial coum-
tries and LDCs. There appear to be considerable differences between 
these two categories. 
After our general analysis of exehange rate regimes since 1973 > we can 
draw the folloWing conclusions with respect to industrial countries 
and LDCs. 
- There have been relatively few changes in the exehange rate policy 
of ICs, especially during the last years of the period under consi-
deration. Within the EC most currencies are linked by the EMS, while 
the Skandinavian currencies are pegged to a basket, and outside 
Europe all industrial countries maintain a floating rate of which 
the most important ones have an independently floating currency. 
*- Within the group of LDCs several developments have taken place with 
respect to exehange rate policy. There has been an important shift 
from dollar pegs to basket pegs and to different forms of (managed) 
floating. French franc pegs were very stable but pegs to the pound 
sterling have now almost completely disappeared. New IMF members 
have shown a preference for dollar pegs and basket pegs. Within the 
group of basket pegs, individual basket pegs are more popular than 
SDR pegs. An independently floating exehange rate is not a very 
popular alternative among LDCs. Although the importance of single 
currency pegs is declining, especially when measured by the combined 
market share of the countries concerned, we must realize that as 
many as 52 currencies still belong to this category. 
We have not further subdivided the LDCs. The reason is that a further 
disaggregation is only useful when it is carried out according to 
criteria for the selection of an exehange rate regime. In the next 
section we will concentrate on this issue. 
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3. THE SELECTION OF AN OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Interest in exhange rate theory and policy has been strongly stimu-
lated by the high degree of exchange rate flexibility and volatility 
since 1973- We would like to stress here that there is an important 
difference between exchange rate theory and the theory of exchange 
rate policy. Exchange rate theory tries to explain the behaviour of 
exchange rates when these rates are flexible13). The exchange rate 
is looked upon as a dependent variable which is determined by cer-
tain explanatory variables. 
On the other hand, the theory of exchange rate policy concerns the 
question of choosing the best policy for managing the exchange rate. 
This is done by trying to find the relation between the exchange rate 
and certain goals of economie policy. Here the exchange rate is consi-
dered to be an instrument. Though there certainly is a relation 
between exchange rate theory and exchange rate policy, in this chapter 
we will only deal with the latter. 
As we have seen in the preceding section, in a world of generalized 
floating there are a number of possible exchange rate regimes. The 
decision which one to select can be divided into three stadia. 
First, a. country has to choose between independent floating and some 
form of exchange rate management. This choice depends mainly on the 
economie characteristics of a country. As we shall see, LDCs are 
generally considered to be peggers. The discussion is largely based on 
the literature on optimal currency areas dating from the beginning of 
the 1960s">4(. 
13) The three mainstreams in exchange rate theory, in order of a 
decreasing time-horizon, are the Purchasing Power Parity Theory 
(PPPT), the monetary approach, and the portfolio approach. Accor-
ding to the PPPT the exchange rate is determined by current ac-
count transactions, according to the monetary theory the relative 
supplies of and demands for money determine the exchange rate 
(under the assumption of PPP), and the portfolio theory puts the 
emphasis on factors as interest rates and exchange rate expecta-
tions. Surveys are given by Argy (1981, pp. 225-i(8) and, on mone-
tary models, by Bilson (1979). 
14) The innovative articles were Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963). 
An extensive survey on the theory of optimal currency areas is 
given by Ishiyama (1975). 
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If pegging is opted for, or if floating proves not feasible, a choice 
has to be made between the different forms of pegging. Since 1975 a 
sizeable literature has emerged on the subject of optimal exchange 
rate pegs. The main choice here is the one between pegging to a single 
currency and pegging to a basket of currencies. 
When a basket peg is selected, a third choice has to be made, i.e. the 
choice between an official basket (SDR, ECU) peg and an individual, 
country-specifie basket peg. 
The three stages in the process of deciding described above, are shown 
in figure 1. In the next three subsections we will analyze these 
choices in more detail. 
Figure 1 Structure of exchange rate policies 
exchange rate policy 
floating pegging 
single pegs basket pegs 
official 
basket pegs (SDR,ECU) 
individual basket 
pegs 
3.1. Floating vs. pegging 
In general floating can be regarded as a 'higher' form of exchange 
rate policy than pegging. Countries, for which it is feasible to have 
a floating rate, are in most cases also feasible 'peggers', but the 
reverse does not hold true. 
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The main result of a truly floating exchange rate is an automatic 
equilibrium on the balance of payments, i.e., on the 'overall' balan-
ce. This automatic equilibrium has two effects. First, the BOP has no 
influence on the domestic money supply. This implies that the domestic 
economy is sheltered from external disturbances. Second, there is no 
need for international reserves, which saves the cost of holding these 
(low interest bearing) reserves15). An additional advantage is the 
fact that there is no risk for the monetary authorities to support a 
wrong (disequilibrium) exchange ratelö). 
We may now wonder why not all countries have a floating rate. This 
brings us to the classical argument against floating rates: the resul-
ting exchange rate uncertainty hampers international trade and invest-
ment"!?). However, this uncertainty only arises when floating rates 
turn out to be volatile. In general we may say that floating rates are 
to be preferred to pegged rates, as long as the rates are 
15) This advantage should not be overestimated, viz. the costs of 
not holding reserves may be high as well. Arguments for holding 
reserves even .under floating exchange rates are given by de Beau-
fort Wijnholds (1977, pp. 121-31/180-86). First, there is a need 
to hold international reserves from the contingency motive, viz. 
as a safeguard for the case of a breakdown of the national or the 
international monetary system. But more important is the argument 
that even under freely floating rates the monetary authorities 
prefer to have the choice between adjustment and financing, becau-
se financing (i.e. the use of reserves) may be less costly than 
adjustment via the exchange rates. 'Window dressing' may also play 
a role in this respect, especially for LDCs. In that case reserves 
are kept as a symbol for credit-worthiness. 
16) Cf. Grubel (1981, p. 500) and Artus and Young (1979, pp. 660-94). 
We must realize that these advantages only occur under totally 
independent floating, i.e. in a situation without any official 
intervention. In practice such a situation hardly ever occurs, and 
for this reason the advantages' must be seen in relation to the 
situation under less freely floating ratès. 
17) The evidence for this argument is ambiguous. A recent IMF study 
casts doubt on the relationship between exchange rate volatility 
and trade, see IMF (1984). A study by the Bank of England (1984) 
arrived at the conclusion that exchange rate volatility had had 
little impact on trade flows between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. On the other hand, a study by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York revealed a significant effect of currency fluc-
tuations on trade between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United States, see Akhtar and Hilton (1984). 
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stable^). This somewhat paradoxical conclusion forms the basis for 
most of the arguments that will be used in the following discussion 
about the choice between floating and pegging. 
What are the relevant characteristics of a country with respect to 
this choice? The most important ones are mentioned below. 
1. Openness. There are two reasons for combining openness with fixed 
exchange rates. The first one is, that in an economy with a high 
(marginal) proposity to import, under fixed rates a relatively 
small adjustment of aggregate demand is enough to restore the BOP 
in the case of a disequilibrium. Precisely the opposite holds true 
for a relatively closed economy. In that case a large adjustment of 
demand is necessary to cause a small change in the BOP. 
A second reason is that in an open economy the effect of exchange 
rate changes on the domestic price level is much more important 
than in a relatively closed economy. This implies that erratic 
short term exchange rate fluctuations, which often accompany a 
floating rate, are more harmful to open economies. On the other 
hand, when inflation is high in other countries, an open economy 
will import this inflation by maintaining fixed rates. Under fixed 
rates, disturbances generated abroad are transferred into the 
domestic economy, while flexible rates have an insulating ef-
fect^). in fact, that open economies should have fixed rates was 
already a conclusion reached by McKinnon, who mentioned openness as 
a criterion for optimum currency areas. 
2. Degree of financial integration. While openness refers to the 
current account, we will now consider the capital account. If a 
country has a well-developed financial market, and if this market 
is integrated in the world financial market, movements in the 
18) In his classic essay 'The case for flexible exchange rates', 
Friedman (1953) sees this as the ideal situation: 'The ultimate 
objective is a world in which exchange rates, while free to vary, 
are in fact highly stable' (p. 158). 
19) If, under fixed exchange rates, the disturbances are of a domestic 
origin, they are 'mitigated by changes in the amount of interna-
tional reserves, while under floating rates they are reflected in 
the exchange rate. Bird (1978) mentions the source of disturbances 
as a separate factor in selecting an optimal exchange rate regime. 
However, because the influence of disturbances is directly related 
to the openness of a country, and because the source of disturban-
ces can hardly be called a country characteristic, we prefer not 
to treat this factor separately. We may add that in the case of 
fixed rates foreign disturbances can also be mitigated by parity-
adjustments or by maintaining a crawling peg. 
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eurrent account can be offset by movements in the capital account, 
thus stabilizing the overall balance or, in the case of floating 
r a t e s , the exchange r a t e . According to the asset market view on 
exchange ra te determination, in the short run the exchange ra te i s 
even completely determined by the equilibrium conditions on the 
financial markets20). Therefore, in the case of internationally 
integrated financial markets, there i s less reason for pegging the 
exchange r a t e . I t could even prove counter-productive, because 
international capital transactions can eas i ly f rus t ra te domestic 
monetary poliey. For instance, a s t r i c t monetary regime aimed at a 
reduction of the inflat ion ra te and resul t ing in high in teres t 
rates, will, in the case of a fixed rate, lead to capital inflows 
that increase the money supply. 
If there i s no integrated financial market, the foreign exchange 
market i s mainly determined by the s i tuat ion on the eurrent ac-
count. Under these circumstances, a floating ra te will only be 
stable if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds even in the short 
run. This i s not a very r e a l i s t i c assumption, and therefore a low 
degree of capital market integration leads to a preference for 
pegged exchange r a t e s . In such a case, the international reserves 
take over the role of the capital account, by softening the impact 
of eurrent account movements on the exchange r a t e s . 
In fact, the criterion of the degree of capital market integration 
is a variant of the factor mobility criterion for composing optimum 
currency areas, as favoured by Mundell. This leads to the remark-
able eonclusion that, though Mundell argued that capital mobility 
is a condition for optimal currency areas and thereby for fixed 
exchange rates, in more recent literature , e.g. Black (1976). 
Branson and Katseli (1981-a) and Crockett and Nsouli (1977), a lack 
of capital mobility is considered to be an argument for pegging the 
exchange rate. 
This paradox can easily be explained. In both views a high degree 
of capital mobility or financial integration is supposed to lead to 
as stable exchange rate. Mundell, however, interpretes this as a 
reason for pegging the exchange rate, while the others conclude 
that a floating rate is also feasible under these circumstances. 
20) See e.g. Branson and Katseli (1981-a, p. 394). They conclude that 
in general gross subs t i tu tab i l i ty of domestic and foreign assets 
in private por t fo l io ' s will suffice for maintaining s t a b i l i t y , 
which i s the essence of the portfolio approach to exchange ra te 
determination (see also fn. 13). 
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3. Market power. The influence that a country can exercise on the 
prices of its imports and exports is called the market power. If a 
country has little market power, this means that it acts as a 
price-taker in the world markets. There is a direct link between 
the value of the trade elasticities and the market power. The 
higher the elasticities of demand for exports, the lower the market 
power on the export side, and the higher the elasticities of supply 
of imports, the lower the market power on the import side21). 
If the market power of a country is low, the monetary authorities 
can hardly influence the terms of trade22). j n that case a float-
ing rate has little effect in sheltering the economy from disturb-
ances abroad, which is an argument for pegging the domestic cur-
rency t'o a single currency; individual basket pegs are less useful 
in this case, as will be made clear in the next two sections. 
Because the influence that can be exercised on prices expressed in 
foreign currencies is often related to the size of a country, some 
authors also consider size as a determining factor in selecting an 
exchange rate policy23). We, however, prefer to look upon size as 
a proxy for the market power and not as a separate factor. 
H. Structure of trade. As we have seen, floating is only feasible if 
the exchange rate remains stable. This stability depends, among 
other factors, on the structure of trade. Disturbances are more 
likely to appear if trade is concentrated in a few sectors and 
directed at a few countries, than when it is well diversified with 
respect to eommodity groups and geographic origin or destination. 
In Table 6.1 we have put the four characteristics together. More 
criteria are mentioned in the literature, but these four are the most 
21) Exact formulas are given by Branson and Katseli (1980). They also 
demonstrate that if both market power on the export and on the 
import side are nil, the terms of trade are affected only by 
shifts in world market prices. For the relation between trade 
elasticities and market power, see also Appendix 1. 
22) Lipschitz demonstrates that if purchasing power parity holds, the 
terms of trade are even completely fixed, see Lipschitz (1979, p. 
427). 
23) Heller even defines the size of a country as the degree of being 
able to influence the world market prices either as a buyer or as 
a seller, see Heller (1979, p. 309, nt.2). According to this 
definition the size of a country is completely equivalent to its 
market power. 
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important ones24). There i s one charac te r i s t i c , which we have not 
yet taken into consideration, although i t i s often mentioned i . e . the 
level of inflat ion25). A high inflat ion ra te causes d i f f icu l t ies in 
pegging the exchange r a t e . Therefore, i t i s not surprising that Heller 
(1978) finds that countries with high inflat ion ra tes tend to adopt a 
floating rate» This, however, does not imply that i t i s desirable 
for these countries to have floating r a t e s . Often exactly the opposite 
holds t rue . A pegged exchange ra te would stimulate an an t i - inf la t ion-
ary policy, though perhaps in the begin ning some adjustments may be 
needed in order to compensate for inflat ion ra te d i f fe ren t ia l s . 
24) Branson and Katseli (1981-a) only mention openness and interna-
tional financial integration as f eas ib i l i t y conditions for f loa t -
ing exchange r a t e s . On the other hand, Bird (1978) gives a l i s t 
of no less than 11 charac ter i s t ics : a) source of disturbances, b) 
openness, c) commodity diversif icat ion of trade, d) geographical 
concentration of trade, e) capital market integrat ion, f) re la t ive 
ra te of inf la t ion, g) trade e l a s t i c i t i e s , h) effect of exchange 
ra tes on absorption and money supply, i ) demand and cost 
management pol ic ies , j ) level of international reserves and k) 
preference for income s t ab i l i t y as opposed to income leve l . 
However, a, h, i and k can hardly be regarded as economie 
character is t ics of a country, while j concerns only a pract ical 
de ta i l . 
Heller (1978), in nis empirical study, makes a dis t inct ion be-
tween s i ze , openness, degree of financial integration, re la t ive 
ra te of inflat ion and foreign trade pattern as factors that 
determine the choice of a part icular exchange ra t e regime. 
' Friedman (1953) discusses the trade-off between price and wage 
r i g id i t y on the one hand, and exchange ra te r ig id i ty on the other 
hand (pp. 164-66). The more f lexible prices and wages are, the 
more s table a floating exchange ra te will be. On the other hand, 
r ig id prices and wages may cause d i f f icu l t ies under a fixed ex-
change ra t e regime. We may expect a positive correlation between 
price/wage r ig id i ty and market power. Countries with a high degree 
of market power can more easily afford the luxury of a certain 
degree of r ig id i ty . in prices and wages. However, these r i g i d i t i e s 
are hard to estimate which makes them unsuitable as yardsticks for 
exchange ra te policy. 
25) See e.g. Heller (1978, p. 311) and Bird (1978, p. 284). The 
authors put that a high ra te of inflat ion in comparison to the 
world average (Heller) or trading partners (Bird) will cause 
d i f f icul t ies in pegging the exchange ra te and will therefore 
stimulate exchange ra te f l ex ib i l i t y . 
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This brings us to an important distinction which must be made with 
respect to exchange rate policy. Apart from choosing an exchange 
Standard, which is the fundamental issue in exchange rate policy, it 
is also necessary to determine at what moment the parity should be 
changed. This second element, which is not often mentioned separ-
ately26), is especially relevant in the case of inflation rate 
differentials. It is possible that a country prefers a certain peg, 
but does not want to accept the resulting rate of inflation. In such a 
case it can regularly or continuously adjust the official parity 
between the domestic currency and the Standard currency or currency 
basket, i.e. it can maintain a 'crawling' peg. Because of this poss-
ibility we do not include the inflation rate under the characteristics 
that should play a role in making a choice between floating and peg-
ging. 
It will be clear from this general discussion that for most LDCs 
floating is not feasible. Often these countries are open, they have 
poorly integrated financial markets, little market power, and a con-
centrated trade structure, especially with respect to exports. There-
fore we cannot expect a floating rate to be very stable. 
An additional argument is that, in the oase of a fixed exchange rate, 
international reserves can ease the burden of real shocks. They can 
have a cushioning effect. This may be an important advantage to LDCs, 
as the impact of real shocks (e.g. harvest shortfalls due to bad 
weather conditions) on these countries can be considerable. Such 
shocks easily lead to expensive real adjustments in the case of a 
floating, and therefore under these shocks sharply fluctuating, ex-
change rate. 
TABLE 5 Characteristics relevant for the choice between pegging 
and floating 
Characteristic 
degree of openness 
degree of financial integration 
market power 
trade structure 
pegging floating 
high low 
low high 
low"l high 
concentrated di versified 
1 With the exception of (individual) basket pegs 
26) One of the few exceptions is Williamson (1981, p. 52) 
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On the other hand, for most industrial countries floating is feasible 
aecording to the characteristics mentioned above. As we already empha-
sized before, this does not imply that these countries should all 
maintain a floating exchange rate, but only that in general floating 
is a feasible alternative. In this respect it should be eraphasized 
that the exchange rates of the currencies of the major industrial 
countries have in fact turned out to be very volatile since they 
started floating in 1973- Therefore, aecording to the criterlon that a 
floating rate should be stable, a return to a system of less flexible 
exchange rates should be considered seriously. 
Pegging the exchange rate can be done in many different ways. We will 
now analyze the criteria upon which the choice between single currency 
pegs and currency basket pegs is dependent. 
3.2. Single pegs vs. basket pegs 
In this section we will first review the advantages and drawbacks of a 
single currency peg, after which we will make a few remarks about the 
selection of the most appropriate Standard currency. 
3.2.1 Relevant criteria 
There are several arguments in favour of a single currency 'peg. The 
main one concerns the reduction of uncertainty in bilateral trade 
between the country that pegs its currency (pegging country) and the 
country that issues the Standard currency (standard currency country). 
The higher the share of the Standard currency country in the interna-
tional trade of the pegging country, the stronger this effect will be. 
We must also take into account the trade shares of other countries 
that peg their currencies to the same Standard currency. The combina-
tion of these trade shares and the trade share of the Standard cur-
rency country, gives a good indication of the percentage of trade that 
does not suffer from exchange rate fluctuations. The relevant trade 
share may even be bigger than this combined share. Such a situation 
occurs when certain commodities are denominated in the Standard 
currency on the world market. However, care should be taken, because 
prices may be expressed in a Standard currency, while being determined 
by other currencies. The currency denomination of trade is therefore 
very hard to establish. 
Apart from 'real' arguments, which refer to international trade, there 
are also reasons of a more monetary character, which argue for pegging 
to a single currency. First of all, we must realize that pegging to a 
Standard currency implies the adoption of the monetary policy in the 
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Standard currency country. We here assume that there are no restric-
tions on international trade and payments. But even if there are, in 
the longer run the growth of the money supply in both countries must 
converge, thereby leading to converging inflation rates27). Pegging 
to a stable Standard currency and the resulting adoption of the raonet-
ary policy of the Standard currency country increases confidence in 
the domestic currency. This increased confidence may facilitate access 
to international capital markets. Pegging to a single Standard cur-
rency may also lead tö the introduction of certain financial services, 
as e.g. a forward exchange market. 
There are also drawbacks to single currency pegs. In a world of float-
ing rates, pegging to one currency means floating with respect to all 
the other currencies that are not linked to the same Standard cur-
rency. This implies uncertainty in international trade^Ö), we must 
also realize that this kind of floating is different from 
independently floating, because the currency floats together with the 
Standard currency. This means that, in comparison with independent 
floating, BOP difficulties are much more likely to occur. The parity 
with the Standard currency may very well lead to an effective exchange 
rate that results in a BOP disequilibrium. Third currency exchange 
rate movements, i.e. movements in the exchange rates of currencies 
other than the home currency and the Standard currency, can be 
responsible for these problems. Therefore, there may be a relatively 
large need for reserves under a single currency peg. 
Apart from problems with respect to the BOP, a single currency peg may 
also result in an exchange rate that is incompatible with other aims 
of economie policy as e.g. stable terms of trade, or - especially in 
the case of LDCs - a stable development of production and employment. 
A number of these drawbacks are avoided by pegging to a basket. On the 
other hand, some of the advantages of a single currency peg are lost 
in such a case. 
The main advantages of a currency basket peg are a stable effective 
exchange rate and the possibility of pursuing an additional target by 
selecting the appropriate currency basket. Both advantages are related 
to each other, as we will see in the next section. 
27) See e.g. Connolly (1981), who demonstrates that those Latin 
American countries that maintained a dollar peg, had much lower 
inflation rates, i.e. closer to the U.S. inflation rate, than 
countries that maintained other exchange arrangements (p. 58/59). 
28) This may be especially harmful to intra-regional trade between 
small LDCs that maintain different single currency pegs, as 
Crockett and Nsouli (1977, p. 150) have pointed out. 
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The main drawback of a basket peg is that none of the bilateral ex-
change rates is really fixed. Even the value of the currency of the 
main trading partner fluctuates. Therefore, it is harder to obtain a 
clear insight in the development of the exchange rate. When a country 
pegs its currency to an individual basket and especially when it 
frequently changes the composition of this basket, the predictability 
of the exchange rate decreases. This may hamper international trade 
and investment, just as in the case of a floating exchange rate. 
However, this effect can be reduced substantially by pegging to a 
well-known official basket as the SDR (see section 3.3). 
An additional drawback of basket pegs is that intervention can not 
take place in the basket-unit itself. Even official baskets as the SDR 
or the ECU can not yet be used as a means of intervention. This im-
plies that intervention must be carried out in key currencies. How-
ever, the value of the basket in terms of a key currency varies from 
moment to moment, thereby making it impossible to maintain a 
rigid29) basket peg. The technical aspects of pegging to a basket 
will be treated more extensively in Appendix 2. The fact that 
intervention cannot take place in the Standard unit itself, however, 
does not lead to serious problems in practice. 
In table 6 we present a short summary of the arguments mentioned 
above. 
We can now draw two conclusions with respect to the choice between 
single currency pegs and currency basket pegs. 
1. If there is one dominating trading partner and if this partner 
happens to be an important industrial country with a solid monetary 
image, pegging to the currency of this trading partner reduces 
uncertainty in international trade and investment to a large ex-
tent, while increasing the confidence in the domestic currency. 
This latter aspect may be of special importance to LDCs. 
2. When the trade pattern is fairly diversified or when the country 
suffers from the effects of third currency exchange rate movements, 
pegging to a basket is preferable. Though the first condition may 
not apply to many LDCs, the second certainly does. 
29) A rigid Standard is a Standard under which the rate of the domes-
tic currency in terms of the Standard unit (here: the currency 
basket) is completely fixed by guarenteed convertibility at the 
official parity. Because the monetary authorities cannot yet 
intervene in currency baskets themselves, it is not yet possible 
to maintain a rigid currency basket peg. 
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TABLE 6 Single pegs vs. basket pegs; a summary of arguments 
SINGLE CURRENCY PEGS 
ADVANTAGES 
1. Reduction of uncertainty 
in bilateral trade and 
investment 
DRAWBACKS 
5. Pegging to one currency 
means floating with respect 
to all other currencies 
2. Fixed rates in terms of other 
currencies that are pegged 
to the same Standard 
currency. 
6. The resulting effective 
exchange rate may lead to 
BOP problems and may con-
flict with domestic aims. 
3. 'Import'of financial services 
4. Increased confidence by 
adoption of the monetary 
policy of the Standard 
currency country 
7. To maintain a single cur-
rency peg, a high level of 
reserves may be needed. 
CURRENCY BASKET PEGS 
ADVANTAGES 
8. A stable effective exchange rate. 
DRAWBACKS 
10. None of the exchange rates 
is constant. 
9. Possibility of pursuing an 
additional target. 
11. Currency baskets can not 
be used as a means of in-
tervention 
12. Insight into the develop-
ment of the exchange rate 
becomes less clear. 
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3.2.2 Selection of a single currency Standard 
In fact there are two candidates for the role of Standard currency: 
the currency of the main trading partner and an international key 
currency30). When the currency of the main trading partner happens 
to be a key currency, there is no further problem. However, such a 
situation does not always occur. What criteria are relevant when we 
have to ehoose between the 'two alternatives? 
From Table 6.2 it is clear that the first argument favours the choice 
of the main trading partner, while arguments two, three and four are 
more relevant in the case of a key currency. On the other hand, in the 
case of a key currency Standard, the arguments against a single cur-
rency peg carry a somewhat greater weight than in the case of a peg to 
the currency of the main trading partner. 
With respect to key currency standards one additional argument needs 
mentioning. As noted already, the importance of a key currency for the 
domestic economy of the pegging country not only depends on the trade 
share of the key currency country, but also on the combined share of 
all trade denominated in the key currency and the currencies that are 
pegged to the key currency. This combined trade share may very well be 
much larger than just the trade share of the key currency country 
itself. 
We may conclude that when the difference between this combined trade 
share and the trade.share of the main trading partner is small, peg-
ging to the key currency is to be preferred. 
When the difference is large, the choice depends on the weight attach-
ed to arguments two, three and four. It is obvious that the less 
developed an economy is, the more weight such arguments will carry, 
and therefore the more appropriate a key currency peg will be. 
30) It is hard to give a proper definition of what is exaetly meant by 
a key currency. In practice, currencies that are important on an 
international level, both in the private sector (international 
trade and financial markets) and in the official sector (reserve 
currencies, Standard currencies and intervention currencies) are 
considered to be key currencies. 
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The choice between different key currencies should also be determined 
by the differences with respect to these three aspects31). This 
implies that the desired rate of inflation may be relevant as well 
(aspect 4). In order to avoid regular parity adjustments, a country 
may select a Standard currency with a rate of inflation equal to the 
(desired) domestic rate of inflation. 
We must keep in mind that often non-economical arguments also play a 
role, especially in the case of former colonies. As Lipschitz (1979) 
put it: "In many cases, for historical reasons a small country will 
peg its currency to that of a major trading partner like the United 
States or the United Kingdom, although it neither trades much with 
that country nor experiences a similar pattern of price inflation" (p. 
441-H2). According to Branson and Katseli (1981-a) political alliances 
and historical antipathies can be relevant as well. As an example they 
mention a few Asian countries that have pegged their currency to the 
dollar, though they trade more with Japan than with the United States. 
However, the fact that the dollar is internationally a more important 
currency than the yen, may also have been an important factor in this 
respect. 
The former colonial link between the pegging country and the Standard 
currency country is especially clear within the group of French franc 
pegs and other single currency pegs (see column 2 and 3 in Table 3). 
3-3 Official basket pegs vs. individual basket pegs 
Basket pegs can be divided into two categories: individual country-
specific basket pegs, which will be discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 6.3 and pegs to an official basket as the SDR or the ECU. Tailor-
made baskets only fit one individual country. Different countries will 
need different baskets according to the country's characteristics and 
the preferences with respect to the development of the exchange rate. 
As we will show in section 6.4, the bilateral exchange rate between 
31) Black (1976) explicitly pays attention to argument two, by intro-
ducing a variance/covariance matrix of exchange rates for the 
determination of an optimal Standard currency. He is one of the 
few authors who clearly specifies his aim in the process of 
selecting a Standard currency. His aim is a stable domestic price 
level of tradable goods. In fact, he argues for a stable relation 
between the price levels of tradable and non-tradable goods (see 
his footnote 6). Important is his conclusion that pegging to the 
main trading partner may not be optimal if the exchange rate of 
the partner's currency is negatively correlated to the exchange 
rates of other important trading partners (p. 17). 
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two currencies that are pegged to a different basket is determined by 
a complicated function of all the bilateral rates between the cur-
rencies in both baskets. Another drawback of individual baskets is 
•their relative obscurity. It is not easy to predict the future value 
of a currency that is pegged to an individual basket, especially not 
when the composition of this basket is changed regularly as a result 
of changing circumstances. 
Thus, a number of countries have opted for a peg to a common basket. 
It is clear that such a common basket cannot be optimal for all the 
countries involved. However, the advantage of having fixed rates with 
a number of trading partners may outweigh the drawback of pegging to a 
suboptimal basket. How should such a common basket be composed? Inter-
national agreement on the basket composition will not be reached 
easily. Some countries will always profit more than others from peg-
ging to a common basket. Therefore, a more practical solution is a 
common peg to an already existing official basket. Such a peg also 
increases confidence in the currencies involved. 
The only official basket that is used as a Standard for exchange rates 
at this moment is the SDR, and therefore our arguments with respect to 
official basket pegs are all based on SDR pegs. Pegging to the SDR nas 
a number of advantages in comparison to individual basket pegs. 
First, it implies fixed rates between all the currencies that rnaintain 
an SDR peg. By pegging to the SDR a country joins the SDR bloc. This 
may have important advantages for international trade and investment 
between the countries within such a bloc. For this reason a common SDR 
peg may be advocated in order to stimulate intra-LDC trade. 
Second, the composition of the SDR is relatively well-known to the 
financial markets. lts value is expressed daily in the main interna-
tional currencies. This implies that financial agents are able to 
predict the value of currencies that are pegged to the SDR in a rela-
tively accurate way, which will facilitate financial transactions in 
these currencies. 
A third advantage of SDR pegs 'is related to the different functions of 
the SDR. Apart from being a currency basket, the SDR also plays the 
role of international reserve unit and, to a moderate extend, it 
serves as a unit of account on international financial markets. Though 
the role of the SDR within the international monetary system is still 
very limited, it may increase and in such a case an SDR peg may have 
additional advantages. 
In this respect we may think about the possibility of using SDRs as a 
means of intervention, as a denominator for international trade, and 
as a unit of account for international financial transactions. In the 
latter case, under an SDR peg, the value of debts would be constant in 
terms of the home currency, which may be considered as an important 
advantage as compared to the situation in which debts are denominated 
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(b) International trade is often denominated in a third (key) currency 
instead of in the currency of the exporting or importing country. 
This last aspect may lead to the conclusion that an LDC should peg to 
such a key currency in order to stabilize export revenues in terms of 
the home currency. However, we need to be cautious here. The prices of 
traded goods, though denominated in terms of a key currency, will 
generally depend on the currency of the buyer as well. When this is 
the case, the prices in terms of the key currency will rise/fall when 
the key currency itself depreciates/appreciates. Together with aspect 
(a) mentioned above, this is an argument to maintain an SDR peg in-
stead of key currency pegs or individual export weighted basket pegs, 
at least with respect to a stable value of exports in terms of the 
home currency. 
We now turn to the import si de of LDCs. It is clear that in general 
the imports of LDCs will be more diversified than the exports. We may 
now wonder to what degree an SDR peg would differ from an import 
weighted basket peg. For the 'old' (1974) SDR basket, Crockett and 
Nsouli (1977) conclude that for most LDCs the SDR peg deviates very 
little from the import weighted basket peg (p. 133). As Black (1976) 
has illustrated, in comparing trade structures with the SDR composi-
tion we must account for the fact that the combined trade share of a 
currency in the basket together with the trade shares of all other 
currencies pegged to this basket currency, should be compared to the 
weight of this specific basket currency in the SDR. This corresponds 
nicely with the fact that the weight of the dollar in the SDR is 
considerably greater than the relative weight of U.S. trade. 
The fact that the SDR basket reflects both the structure of the im-
ports of many LDCs, and the currency-mix that is relevant for LDC-
exports, gives an indication of the fact that under an SDR peg the 
EER, when defined as a function of trade weights, will be relatively 
stable. Williamson indeed concludes from recent research that '...for 
the vast majority of developing countries, the SDR would have produced 
less instability of the EER than any single currency peg or than the 
ECU' (p. 58). In addition, Connolly (1983) finds that an SDR peg, just 
as a basket peg based on trade shares, leads to approximately the same 
variance in the imported inflation as a special variance minimizing 
basket (p. 70). 
A short summary of the arguments mentioned above is presented in Table 
7. 
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TABLE 7 Official baskets vs. individual baskets 
Advantages official basket pegs Drawbacks official basket pegs 
Fixed rates with all other 
currencies that are pegged 
to the same basket. This 
stimulates trade and in-
vestment within the basket-bloc. 
5. No possibility of pursuing 
an additional target. 
A clearer insight in the de-
velopment of the exchange 
rate which promotes confidence 
in the local currency. 
Possibility of concluding 
(financial) transactions in the 
basket unit of account. 
(Future) possibility of using 
a means of intervention based 
on the same basket. 
Decisions with respect to 
the composition of the bas-
ket may conflict with the 
interests of the countries 
that maintain a basket peg. 
If no adjustments take place 
the weighting structure of 
the basket will soon deviate 
substantially from the ini-
tial situation in the case 
of exchange rate volatility. 
3.1 Practice compared with theory 
Although many authors have analyzed the possible determinants of 
exchange rate policy, little empirical research has been undertaken to 
quantify the impact of these determinants. An important consideration 
has certainly been that it is not very easy to model exchange rate 
policy as a function of the characteristics of a country. 
If only one determining factor is taken into account, the problem is a 
relatively easy one. For each exchange rate regime the mean value (and 
variance) of the variable that is assumed to determine the exchange 
rate "policy can be calculated. If there is a significant difference 
between the average values of the explanatory variable under different 
exchange rate regimes, this variable is supposed to be of importance 
for the choice between these regimes. This method has been foliowed by 
Branson and Katseli (1980). For different exchange rate regimes they 
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calculate the net market power32)
 0f the countries involved (p.67). 
Their conclusions are in accordance with theoretical observations. Net 
market power is low among LDCs that maintain a single currency peg and 
high in the case of basket pegs and limited exchange rate flexibility. 
In another article, Branson and Katseli (1981-a) follow a similar 
strategy with respect to the GDP. Using data from 1975 they conclude 
that both mean GDP per- capita and mean GDP in absolute terms are 
highest among the group of countries with a floating exchange rate and 
lowest among countries that maintain a single currency peg. We will 
come back to these results later in this section. 
The method described above is only possible in the case of one explan-
atory variable. When we want to measure the impact of different 
variables simultaneously, other methods are needed. The main problem 
is that exchange rate policy is not a continuous variable. It can not 
be measured in units. It can only be classified according to certain 
criteria (see e.g. Table 3). This precludes the use of 'classical' 
econometrics. However, there are different econometrie methods to 
solve this problem. We will shortly review two alternative solutions 
that have been introduced. 
Dreyer (1978) uses probit analysis 33). He makes a distinction be-
tween three categories: pegged, flexible and floating exchange rates. 
His estimation is based on a cross-section analysis for 88 developing 
countries. He concludes that the size of an economy hardly influences 
the choice of an exchange rate regime. His other explanatory variables 
32) The net market power is the difference between market power on the 
export side and market power on the import side (see also Appen-
dix 1). However, for calculating market power price-elasticities 
in international trade must be used. These data are not readily 
available, especially not for LDCs, and therefore Branson and 
Katseli use approximations of market power. They approximate 
market power on the export/import side by summing up the country's 
export/import share of a commodity in world trade weighted by 
the relative importance of this commodity in the country's 
exports/imports. However, this measure is not very reliable for 
industrial countries, which often combine a diversified trade 
pattern with a relatively high degree of market power. 
33) The essence of this method is to look upon the dependent variable 
as a probability, which implies that it is a figure between 0 and 
1. By applying a transformation with the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function of Standard normal variables as a trans-
formation function, the interval is transformed from (0,1) into (-
», +•»). For a further description of this technique, see Theil 
(1971, pp. 628-31). 
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do have a significant effect. Openness has a positive influence on the 
degree of fixation, just as geographical and structural diversifi-
cation of trade. However R (=coëfficiënt of determination adjusted for 
the number of explanatory variables) equals 0.611 which means that 
there are probably other factors that have a substantial influence on 
the choice of an exchange rate regime. 
A different approach is foliowed by Heller (1978). He uses discrimi-
nant analysis34) for a cross-section study of the exchange rate 
arrangements as of July 1976. He only makes a distinction between 
countries with a floating rate and countries with a pegged rate. 
Included are 86 countries of which 77 have a pegged rate and 9 have a 
floating rate. Not included are the snake countries and countries that 
maintain a crawling peg policy. His explanatory variables are the size 
of a country, the degree of openness, the degree of financial integra-
tion, the relative inflation rate and the geographic concentration of 
trade. All the estiraated parameters fit in with the a priori expecta-
tions. An interesting conclusion resulted from applying the estimated 
equation to the Snake countries. All these countries are supposed to 
have a pegged exchange rate, with the exception of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. This leads to the conclusion that the Snake arrange-
ment can be regarded as a Deutsche mark bloc. 
Heller also estimates equations for the choices between a dollar peg 
and a French franc peg, a dollar peg and a basket peg, and a French 
franc peg and a basket peg respectively. It appears that trade shares 
are the determining factor. Countries that have important trade-rela-
tions with the United States often peg to the dollar, countries that 
trade intensively with France are more apt to peg to the French franc 
and countries with a diversified trade pattern most often peg to a 
basket. 
In examining these results one important aspect should not be forgot-
ten. Both authors measure the determinants of actual exchange rate 
practices, not of optimal exchange rate regimes. What they measure 
is 'revealed preference'. In most cases, however, it appears that 
actual behaviour as revealed by econometrie analysis is in line with 
theoretieal arguments. 
We will conclude this section with a brief study on the relation 
between GNP and exchange rate policy. In Table 8 LDCs have been 
34) The aim of this technique is to form an equation that separates 
the data in different groups, so that within a group the variance 
of different explanatory variables is minimized, while between 
groups the variance is maximized. 
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subdivided into four categories. A distinction has been made between 
low-income, middle-income, upper middle-income and high-income LDCs. 
This classification was derived from the World Development Report 
1984. 
The reason for relating per capita GNP to the different types of 
exchange rate regimes has been the following: In the three sections on 
the selection of an exchange rate regime we noted that an important 
determining factor was confidence. Single currency pegs and official 
basket pegs may be preferred to individual basket pegs for reasons of 
confidence. In spite of the fact that a dollar peg or an SDR peg will 
generally not be optimal from a purely theoretical point of view, i.e. 
the optimization or stabilization of a target variable will generally 
favour an individual basket peg, these pegs may nevertheless be selec-
ted because they provide confidence in the domestic currency. We can 
expect this argument to be more relevant in the case of a weak economy 
than in the case of a strong economy. 
In fact, a foreign currency can be regarded as a claim on a foreign 
economy. The stronger this foreign economy is, the higher the confi-
dence will be in the value of such a claim. Therefore, weak economies 
will generally profit more from a key currency peg or an official 
basket (SDR) peg than strong economies. 
From Table 8 we can deduce that this theoretical statement is in line 
with practice. Of the low-income economies 62 percent maintain a 
single currency peg or an SDR peg. For middle-income, upper middle-
income and high-income LDCs these shares were respectively 52,35 and 
29 percent. 
On the other hand, the relative share of more flexible arrangements 
increases with income. Of the low-income LDCs only 22 percent main-
tained such an arrangement, while this percentage increases to 57 for 
high-income LDCs. This is in accordance with our earlier conclusion 
that the more developed an economy is, the more feasible a flexible 
exchange rate will be. 
TABLE 8 Exchange arrangements and GMP 1
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It is also interesting to note that individual basket pegs are some-
what more popular among upper middle-income economies than under 
middle and low-income economies. We may conclude that the more de-
veloped an economy is, the less important the role of confidence in 
the selection of an exchange rate regime will be, and that, as a 
result, a well-known currency or currency basket will less frequently 
be chosen as a Standard for the exchange rate. 
The fifth row in Table 8 contains the average GNP per capita of the 
LDCs that maintain a similar exchange arrangement. LDCs for which no 
per capita GNP was given in the World Development Report were excluded 
from the computation. Our earlier conclusions are completely in line 
with the figures in this row: low values for single currency pegs ($ 
1.2 thousand) and SDR pegs ($ O.M thousand) and relatively high fig-
ures for individual basket pegs ($ 2.3 thousand) and flexible arrange-
ments ($ .3-4 thousand). The difference between SDR pegs and individual 
basket pegs is striking. Mean GNP per capita is about six times as 
high in LDCs that have pegged their currency to an individual basket 
than among LDCs that maintain an SDR peg. This again supports our 
conclusion that SDR pegs are mainly attractive for weak economies 
while stronger economies prefer to compile an individual basket. 
In a similar study carried out by Branson and Katseli (1981-a) for the 
year 1975, the authors exclude the OPEC-members and Bahrein "on the 
ground that their recent jump in income was not matched by an equally 
rapid development of industry and financial markets" (p. 396). 
In our opinion this argument is less relevant nowadays. 
Nevertheless, we have also included a row in which high-income oil 
exporting LDCs are excluded. Especially in the category 'limlted 
flexibility' this results in a sharp reduction in per capita GNP. 
However, our conclusions do not alter because of this. Strong, non 
oil-exporting LDCs appear to prefer a flexible arrangement or an 
individual basket peg, and the weaker LDCs prefer a single currency 
peg or an SDR peg. 
When we compare oil exporting countries to industrial countries there 
is a remarkable difference with respect to exchange rate policy. While 
none of the industrial countries have pegged their currency to the 
dollar, all but one of the high-income oil experting countries main-
tain a dollar peg or have limited the flexibility of their currency in 
terms of the dollar. This implies that the exchange rate risk on their 
export (oil) revenues is low, which may have been an important reason 
for selecting a dollar peg. 
Finally, Table 8 shows that within the group of industrial countries 
there is little difference in per capita GNP between the different 
exchange arrangements. 
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4. THE COMPOSITION OF A BASKET 
4.1. Introduotion 
When a decision is taken in favour of a basket peg, the composition of 
the basket must be determined next. First, it is necessary to select 
the currenoies that are to take part in the basket. In general we may 
say that a small number of currenoies should be preferred to a large 
number. First, because it gives a clearer insight to market partici-
pants how the exchange rate behaves and second, because it is easier 
for the monetary authorities to maintain a basket peg with respect to 
a few currenoies than with respect to many different currenoies. 
The best method is to determine the number of currenoies in the basket 
once the weighting scheme has been formulated. In that case, all the 
currencies with a weight below than the chosen threshold value are 
eliminated from the basket. The resulting gap is afterwards filled by 
a proportional increase of all weights over the threshold value35). 
When two currencies have about the same weight, the threshold value 
should be determined in such a way as to avoid that only one of these 
currencies enters the basket. 
After these general considerations with respect to the number of 
currencies represented in the basket, we will now turn to the subject 
of this section which is the weighting structure within the basket. As 
we will demonstrate in Appendix 2 a basket peg implies a stable avera-
ge or effective exchange rate. In section 4.2 we will give a defini-
tion of effective exchange rates and discuss the relationship with 
currency baskets more extensively. It appears that an effective ex-
change rate can only be defined in relation to a target variable. 
In section 4.3 we will discuss the transmission process from instru-
ment to target, while in section 4.4 different targets and the accom-
panying currency basket pegs are reviewed. A special and very popular 
type of basket is the trade-weighted basket, which will be discussed 
in more detail in section 4.5. Trade-weighted basket pegs can be 
distinguished from other individual basket pegs by the fact that often 
35) An important exception to this rule for the determination of a 
basket concerns the composition of the ECU. In the case of this 
basket, currencies were selected aecording to the criterion of EC 
membership. This resulted in very small weights for certain cur-
rencies. Political arguments, more than economie arguments, deter-
mined the composition of the ECU. We may add that, as already 
noted in section 2, the role of the ECU as a Standard basket in 
exchange rate policy is still very limited. 
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a clearly defined target of exchange rate policy is lacking. There-
fore, we can subdivide individual basket pegs into optimal basket 
pegs, which do imply the existence of a well-defined target variable, 
and trade-weighted basket pegs. This division is shown in Figure 2, 
which can be regarded as a further refinement of Figure 1 . 
Figure 2 Individual basket pegs 
individual basket 
compositions 
optimal baskets trade-weighted 
baskets 
4.2 Basket pegs and effective exchange rates 
Pegging to a basket is equivalent to the stabilization of an effective 
exchange rate36). Both expressions mean that the monetary authori-
ties flx an average exchange rate, i.e. a weighted average of bilate-
ral exchange rates. We often encounter the expression 'the effective 
exchange rate' which suggests that there is a unique concept of this 
variable. This, however, is not true. There exist an infinite number 
of effective exchange rates37). 
The key to what is meant by an effective exchange rate lies in the 
word effective. An effective exchange rate measures the effect 
that the exchange rate exerts on a chosen economie variable. For every 
economie variable that is dependent on the exchange rate, a different 
36) For a technical analysis see Appendix 2-III-2/4. 
37) In economie literature, effective exchange rates often refer to 
trade-weighted combinations of bilateral exchange rates, see e.g. 
Black (1976, p. 10), Crockett and Nsouli (1979, p. 13) and 
Williamson (1982, p. 52). The exact interpretation of these rates 
is not always completely clear. 
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effective exchange rate can be composed. When the effective exchange 
rate remains constant, this implies that the corabined effect of all 
bilateral exchange rate changes on the chosen target variable, is nil. 
But we should be careful here. A zero change in the effective exchange 
rate does not imply that there have not been any changes in the bila-
teral exchange rates, or that these changes have had no effect on the 
target variable, but only that these (bilateral) influënces have 
cancelled each other out. 
Nor does a zero change in the effective exchange rate mean that the 
target variable has remained constant. This variable may very well 
have changed under influence of explanatory variables different frora 
the exchange rates. 
What does it mean when an effective exchange rate decreases by one per 
cent? The answer to this question depends on the target variable that 
is chosen. A one percent decrease of the effective exchange rate 
has the same effect on the target variable as a simultaneous one per-
cent decrease of all the bilateral exchange rates. Again we stress 
the fact that only the effect on the chosen target variable raust be 
the same. 
An example may illustrate the definition presented above. If we choose 
the value of exports (expressed in the home currency) as our target 
variable, this implies that the effective exchange rate must show the 
effect of exchange rate changes on the value of exports. Now let us 
assume that the exporting country is a price taker on its export 
markets, and that the supply of exports is completely inelastic. It is 
easy to see that in this case the weights for the determination of the 
effective exchange rate must be equal to the export trade shares. E.g. 
a one per cent decrease of the exchange rate between the home currency 
and the currency of a trading partner with a trade share of 10 per 
cent, has an effect on the total value of exports equal to a uniform 
decrease of all bilateral exchange rates of 0.1 per cent. 
It will be clear that it is not the level of the effective exchange 
rate that counts, but only the rate of.change. 
In his authoritative article on effective exchange rates, Rhomberg 
(1976) distinguishes between seven possible methods of composing an 
effective exchange rate. Six out of these seven are based on trade 
shares and will be discussed in section 4.5. The highly restricted 
relevance of effective exchange rates based on trade shares, was one 
of the reasons why members of the IMF staff constructed a model in 
which the effect of exchange rate changes on trade flows was given 
more attention. This model resulted in the seventh effective exchange 
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rate referred to above. We will briefly disouss the main characteris-
tics of the so-called Multilateral Exchange Rate Model or MERM38). 
The model is set up to study the effect of exchange rate changes in 
the medium term (two to three years). Twenty countries and groups of 
countries39) are examined, as well as six commodity classes. A 
commodity produced by a certain country is called a product, which 
implies that there are 120 products. Demand and supply equations for 
all products are derived, partly by a priori judgement on parameter 
estimates and partly - especially with regard to price elasticities of 
demand — by obtaining parameters from econometrie studies1*0). 
Apart from measuring the effects of exchange rate changes on trade 
flows, the model can also be used to calculate exchange rate changes 
that are necessary to achieve certain BOP targets, and to derive the 
effects of diverging inflation rates on the trade balance in the case 
of fixed exchange rates. The effective exchange rate that can be 
derived from the model, is described in the following way: "The effec-
tive exchange rate of a currency can be defined as the change that 
would induce the same alteration in its trade balance expressed in the 
numeraire currency as that brought about by a given realignment of all 
exchange rates2*!). In fact, the MERM was one of the first models 
that produced an effective exchange rate that was determined by a well 
defined economie target variable (the trade balance). 
38) For an extensive description of the fundamentals, see Artus and 
Rhomberg (1973). A revised and extended version of the model, 
MERM-2, is presented in Artus and Mcguirk (1981). This second 
version is discussed here. The effective exchange rate derived 
from the MERM is published monthly in the IMF/International Finan-
cial Statistics for all the individual countries that are repre-
sented in the model. 
39) Included are all industrial countries (also Switzerland) except 
Iceland and New-Zealand, the group of oil exporting countries and 
a rest category of other countries. 
40) In general it is very hard to obtain reliable data on price elas-
ticities in international trade, especially with respect to LDCs1. 
For this reason individual LDCs are not represented in the model. 
However, a specialo multilateral exchange rate model for primary 
producing countries was developed by Feltenstein, Goldstein and 
Schadler in 1979. 
41) Artus and Rhomberg (1976, pp. 606/607) 
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What implications do these remarks about effective exchange rates have 
for currency basket pegs? As we have seen, effective exchange rates 
are helpful in measuring the overall effect of bilateral exchange rate 
changes on a chosen economie variable. Pegging to a basket implies the 
stabilization of an effective exchange rate, and thus it is a form of 
exchange rate policy whereby the effects of bilateral exchange rate 
changes on a chosen variable are minimized. 
H.3 Instruments and targets 
Pegging to a basket means that the value of the home currency is 
pegged to a basket of other currencies. In order to measure the value 
of currencies, a numeraire must be chosen. Our numeraire will be the 
intervention currency. This implies that the value of the home curren-
cy expressed in the intervention currency is kept equal to the value 
of the currency basket in terms of the intervention currency. In 
Appendix 2-III-1 we will demonstrate that the character of a basket 
peg does not depend on the intervention currency that is selected. The 
formula for a currency basket peg now becomes: 
t N t 
e O N = ^ n i e i N (1) 
(For a list of symbols see Appendix 2-1) 
The numbers n^ can be derived from the desired weighting structure 
by the formula: 
n. = w.e° (2) 
1 1 Oi 
Equation (1) represents an absolute basket, i.e. a basket consisting 
of a number of currencies. A basket peg can also be formulated in 
relative terms. In that case the basket consists of a weighted average 
of proportionate changes of the exchange rates. 
4 = ] WiêiN (3) 
The main difference between both baskets is that under a relative 
basket peg the weights of the currencies in the basket are fixed, 
while under an absolute basket peg these weights depend on the exchan-
ge rates. 
A detailed discussion on the differences and similarities between 
absolute and relative basket pegs will be presented in Appendix 2-
II/III-3. 
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Both under an absolute and a relative basket peg the instrument is 
the bilateral exchange rate between the home currency and the inter-
vention currency, i.e.: 
60N a n d ê0N ' • 
The indicator for this bilateral exchange rate is the effective 
exchange rate. Under an absolute basket peg, the effective exchange 
rate that is kept constant, is: 
N
 t 
Z n.ej0 - 1 (4) 
whilê under a relative basket peg a weighted average of proportionate 
changes in the exchange rates is set equal to zero^2). 
N
 t 
E
 W.êJ0 = 0 (5) 
In order to determine the weights wj_ an operational target varia-
ble1^) has to be selected. This target variable must be a function 
of all the (proportionate charges in) bilateral exchange rates 
e (ê._). Optimizing or stabilizing the target variable, under the 
ceteris paribus condition with respect to other exogenous variables, 
leads to a relation that can be rewritten in the form of equation (1) 
or equation (2). 
In most cases the operational target variable is not the final aim, 
but it is a variable that is optimized or stabilized in order to reaeh 
a final target. These final targets are often difficult to express in 
terms of bilateral exchange rates. 
Examples of operational target variables are the domestic price level, 
the terms of trade and the ratio of the price level of tradables and 
non-tradables. This last ratio is also called the internal terms of 
trade or the internal price ratio. 
42) For a proof, see Appendix 2-III-1. As we shall demonstrate, 
relative basket pegs are not equivalent to absolute basket pegs. 
Nor is the proportionate change in the EER as defined in (4), 
equal to the left-hand side of equation (5). 
43) These terms are derived from the analysis of monetary policy, for 
which a similar distinction between instruments, indicators, ope-
rational (intermediate) targets and final (ultimate) aims can be 
made. 
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Most of the operational target variables are a function of price 
levels, which are in turn determined by exehange rates. Final aims may 
be the level and/or stability of real income, output or employment, as 
well as equilibrium on the balance of payments. The rate of inflation 
may be considered as an operational target variable and a final aim at 
the same time. The course from instruments to final targets is presen-
ted in Figure 3> 
Figure 3 Instruments and targets under as basket peg 
INSTRUMENT —*- INDICATOR OPERATIONAL ->— FINAL AIM 
TARGET VARIABLE 
bilateral exehange effective e.g. price e.g. real income 
rate between home exehange level, terms of output, employ-
curreney and rate trade, interna- ment, equili-
intervention cur- tional terms brium on the BOP 
rency of trade 
To clarify the actual derivation of the weights, we will,conclude this 
section with an example, based on the derivation of basket weights in 
Branson and Katseli (1981, pp. 405-414). 
We assume that the final aim is stability in the output structure. 
This stability is, inter alia, influenced by the internal terms of 
trade. If the internal terms of trade are stable there is no incentive 
to change the allocation of resources. Therefore, the internal terms 
of trade (ITOT) may very well serve as an operational target variable 
in this specific case. The ITOT are defined as the ratio of the price 
level of traded goods (PT) and the price level of non-traded goods 
(?NT). 
ITOT = PT/PNT (6) 
Stabilizing the ITOT implies that ITOT = 0, or that P = P 
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Both price levels can be expressed in terms of the bilateral exchange 
rates e (i=1...N), and two vectors v of other exogenous varia-
U I I )(i 
bles: 
N
 t PT = PT ^ V o i ' V ; 
N
 t PNT " PNT(^  Voi'V 
Under the ceteris paribus condition we can set v-| = V2 = 0. 
Using equation (6) and rewriting the exchange rates in terms of the 
intervention currency, we obtain the following basket peg equation: 
t N t 
ên = E w.(a.,b.)ê ; with weights w. that are a function of 
both a. and b.. 
ï ï 
4.4 Target variables 
As we have seen, pegging to a basket is only possible after a target 
variable nas been chosen. However, care should be taken not to confuse 
two different aspects of exchange rate policy, i.e. the policy direc-
ted at the level of the exchange rate and the policy directed at the 
stability of the exchange rate. We already encountered the difference 
between these two aspects in our discussion on the influence of the 
inflation rate in exchange rate policy. 
The level of the exchange rate can be chosen independently of the 
composition of the currency basket to which the home currency is tied. 
In the case of an absolute basket peg the level can be adjusted by a 
uniform change in the numbers of currencies in the basket. The formula 
for a relative basket peg does not even change when the level of the 
peg is adjusted. 
The reason for putting so much stress on the difference between the 
desired level of the exchange rate and the movements around this 
equilibrium rate, is the frequent confusion over this matter. Pegging 
to a basket does not necessarily include a decision on the level of 
the exchange rate. Therefore, exchange rate targets should also be 
divided into two categories: a category of long run optimization 
targets and a category of short run stabilization targets. The first 
category should determine 'the level of the exchange rate in the longer 
run, while the second category should lead to an optimal short-term 
behaviour of the exchange rates. 
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In fact, there is only one long term target that dominates all other 
targets in this category, i.e. BOP equilibrium. A disequilibrium of 
the BOP cannot last for long and therefore in the long run the BOP 
position mainly determines the exchange rate1*1*). Though capital 
transactions certainly do have a considerable influence on the BOP in 
the short run, in the long run it is the current account that matters 
most. For this reason, equilibrium on the current account, also called 
external balance, is an important target in the longer term, but it is 
not necessarily a short-term target. 
We will now turn to short run target variables. In the short run 
stabilization is more important than optimization. Under the system of 
Bretton Woods an exchange rate could well be stabilized. It simply had 
to be pegged to the dollar/gold and all bilateral exchange rates would 
automatically be fixed. As already noted, this is no longer possible 
in a world of floating exchange rates. In such a world pegging to one 
currency means floating with respect to the others. The main source of 
instability comes from third currency exchange rate movements. This 
instability cannot be taken away by a single currency peg, büt the 
effect of it on the domestic economy can be reduced substantially by 
pegging to a currency basket. As Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980) 
have pointed out: "The composition of the basket is generally related 
to the stability objective of minimizing the effects of exchange rate 
fluctuations on the economy" (p. 82). 
We may add that in the case of a basket peg there is an additional 
'degree of freedom' in comparison to the case of a single currency 
peg. This 'degree of freedom' refers to the possibility of selecting a 
tailor-made basket peg that neutralizes the effects of third currency 
movements on a chosen target variable. 
A brief survey of the targets mentioned in the literature on currency 
baskets is presented below1^). Mot always is a distinction made 
between final aims and operational targets, see e.g. the study by 
44) An exception is formed by countries that issue the Standard cur-
rency. These countries can afford BOP deficits for longer periods, 
as other countries are generally willing to hold certain stocks of 
the Standard currency. The direction of the relation between the 
exchange rate and the BOP depends on whether the exchange rate is 
fixed or flexible. If it is fixed, the exchange rate determines 
the BOP and if it is floating freely, the situation on the BOP 
determines the exchange rate. 
45) For a more detailed description, see Williamson (1982). 
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The balance of trade or the current account has also been proposed as 
a target variable1^). We already saw that the level of the current 
account can best be influenced by the level of the peg and not by its 
character. With respect to fluctuations in the trade balance it may be 
better to adjust for these changes by financing, i.e. the use of 
reserves, than by exchange rate policy. Certainly in the short run 
there is little reason for aiming at a (continuous) current account 
equilibrium. For Williamson this is the reason to reject all basket 
pegs aimed at external equilibrium and to concentrate fully on inter-
nal equilibrium, i.e. the stabilization of output and employment, in 
compiling currency baskets. 
What is the effect of exchange rate movements on the internal equili-
brium, and how can this equilibrium be sheltered from exchange rate 
movements? It is clear that internal equilibrium is a final aim. The 
internal terms of trade are a suitable target variable. A change in 
this variable will lead to a change in the allocation of resources. A 
decrease in the internal terms of trade will result in a shift from 
the production of tradables to the production of non-tradables. An 
increase has exactly the opposite effect. It is clear that (rever-
sible) changes in the internal terms of trade can be very harmful to 
the economy because of these shifts in the allocation of resources. 
Therefore, stabilizing this variable can be considered as an important 
objective of short term exchange rate policy. This holds true espe-
cially for LDCs that are unable to influence their (external) terms of 
trade. As Black (1976) has pointed out: '... the main channel through 
which exchange rates affect the economy is the ratio of traded goods 
prices to non-traded goods prices' (p. 37). 
A somewhat different approach was chosen by Lipschitz and Sundara-
rajan50). They discuss real instead of nominal basket pegs. 
49) See e.g. Branson and Katseli' (1981-a, p. 413) and Flanders and 
Helpman (1979, pp. 534-35). Crockett and Nsouli (1977) mention the 
BOP as their target without any further specification. 
50) See Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980). The authors published a 
short summary of their art iele in Finance and Development, volume 
17 no. 2 (June 1980), pp. 25~28. In Lipschitz and Sundararajan 
(1982) they combine their model with the weighting structures 
derived by Branson and Katseli (1981) for the terms of trade and 
the trade balance objective. In contrast with Branson and Katseli, 
who assumed that prices are constant (see p. 411), Lipschitz and 
Sundararajan rewrite the formulas for the weights in terms of 
exchange rates and prices. 
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Under a real basket peg a real effective exchange rate is stabili-
zed. The word 'real'refers to an adjustment for inflation rate diffe-
rentials. Unfortunately, real effective exchange rates are hard to 
stabilize, because of the lack of recent data on changes in general 
price levels. Such data are only available with some delay. Lipschitz 
and Sundararajan try to overcome this problera by the introduction of a 
second step, that succeeds the determination of the weights in the 
real effective exchange rate. In fact, they transfer the real bas-
ket, which is based on elasticity weights derived from the MERM, into 
a nominal basket by adjusting the elasticity weights for the varlan-
ce/covariance structure of the price levels and the exchange rates. 
This adjustment takes place by minimizing the variance in the real 
effective exchange rate. 
The final result of this method is that the more the bilateral exchan-
ge rate between a currency and the home currency deviates from its PPP 
level, the higher the weight of this currency in the basket will be. 
On the other hand, if PPP holds exactly for a certain currency, the 
weight of this currency is set at zero. A few critical remarks can be 
made with respect to this approach. 
As the authors notice themselves, their method is only feasible under 
the condition that variances and covariances are stable over time (p. 
96). However, even if this condition is fulfilled in the past, this 
does not imply that it will also be fulfilled in the future. Especial-
ly when the exchange rate is pegged to a basket according to the 
method described above, this may very well lead to a changing pattern 
of variances and covariances. 
One further study needs to be mentioned because of its special charac-
ter. Turnovsky (1982) set up a general equilibrium macro model in 
order to derive optimal weights for a currency basket. His approach 
differs from the one chosen by other authors with respect to capital 
flows. Turnovsky assumes perfect capital mobility while in former 
studies capital flows were almost completely neglected. The reason for 
this neglect may have been the fact that the degree of capital mobili-
ty in LDCs most other studies deal especially with LDCs is 
low. Exchange rates are endogenous and mainly determined by interest 
rates in Turnovsky's model. His target is the stabilization of domes-
tic real income, which is the same target that was chosen by the only 
other authors who used a general equilibrium model to derive optimal 
weights, i.e. Flanders and Helpman. 
Until now we have only considered target variables that bear indi-
rectly relation to the bilateral exchange rates, often through the 
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channel of price levels. For an illustration we may refer to the 
example given in section 4.3. The resulting calculations often lead to 
cumbersome formulas for the optimal weights. Even negative weights are 
very well possible51). Though certainly valuable from a theoretical 
point of view, the practical application of basket pegs based on such 
weighting schemes may be difficult. 
First it may be hard to find suitable data on elasticities (especially 
for LDCs), on variance/covariance matrices of exchange rates, and on 
priees. Often these data are only available at some delay. 
An alternative would be to use data from previous years but in that 
case we must assume that these exogenous variables are stable, which 
is not always a realistic assumption. It may even be doubtful whether 
certain data that are readily available, are stable enough to be 
used for exchange rate policy. In this case we refer to the variances 
and covariances of exchange rates. 
A second drawback concerns the predictability of exchange rates. The 
choice for a basket peg already implies the acceptance of a certain 
loss in predictability of the exchange rate in comparison to the 
alternative of a single currency peg. This drawback is certainly 
aggravated by the use of complex basket formulas, especially when 
these have to be adjusted frequently as a result of changing data. 
We may conclude that there is a certain tension between theory and 
practice. Baskets that are optimal from a theoretical point of view, 
may be suboptimal in practice. On the other hand the call for clarity 
from the exchange markets, may conflict with economie aims. A compro-
mise may be found in baskets based on trade weights. These baskets 
will be discussed in the next section. 
51) See e.g. Turnovsky (1982,. p. 3^3), Branson and Katseli (1980,p. 
61), Flanders and Tischler (1978, pp. 402-403) and Flanders and 
Helpman (1979, p. 541). 
56 
4.5 Baskets based on trade weights 
Trade weighted baskets certainly deserve our attention as most LDCs 
that maintain a basket peg, do so in terms of a basket based on trade 
shares52). 
In this section we will primarily deal with the interpretation of 
trade-weighted basket pegs. Pegging to a basket that is based on trade 
shares is equivalent to the stabilization of an effective exehange 
rate (EER) that is based on these trade shares. 
When we now define: 
ajj = exports from country i to country j; 
b|j = imports of country i coming from country j; 
the following weighting structures53) can be compiled: 
export weights : w. 
import weights : w. 
(total) trade weights : w. 
world trade weights : w. 
All these weighting structures correspond to a target variable, i.e. a 
variable that is kept constant when the exehange rate is pegged to a 
basket based on one of these weighting structures. It can easily be 
verified (see Appendix 2) that for an export weighted basket the 
target variable is the price level of exports, or in the case of 
inelastic supply and perfectly elastic demand, the value of exports. 
52) Cf. IMF-Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual 
Report 1984. A description of the individual baskets used by LDCs 
in their exehange rate policy can be found in part two (country 
pages) under the heading 'Exchange Arrangements' (Position on 
December 1983). A few countries not only use trade.shares but also 
incorporate capital transactions (Algeria) or currency denomina-
tion of trade (Malaysia) in the derivation of the weights. 
Botswana has pegged its currency to a basket consisting of SDRs 
(50 per cent) and South-African rands (50 per cent), which can be 
regarded as a combination of an offical basket peg and an 
individual basket peg. In practically all cases the dollar is used 
as the intervention currency. 
53) For a more detailed discussion of EERs based on trade weights see 
Rhomberg (1976, esp. p. 95). Apart from the basic types of EERs 
mentioned above, Rhomberg also distinguishes combinations of these 
basic types. However, it is very hard to give an economie inter-
pretation to EERs based on such "combined" weights. 
- v;v 
=
 (aoj + V^oj + V; 
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Similarly, it can be derived that the target variable corresponding to 
import weights is the price level of imports. The target variable 
corresponding to (total) trade weights is the arithmatic average of 
the price levels of imports and exports. It is obvious that the more 
the distribution of exports over countries of destination differs from 
the distribution of imports over countries of origin, the more the 
average price level will differ from both constituent price levels. 
In all three cases mentioned above we have Implicitly assumed that 
there is no inflation. This assumption is only realistic in the short 
run, when exehange rates are generally more flexible than prices. 
Pegging to a basket based on world trade weights implies the stabili-
zation of the purchasing power of the home currency in terms of all 
the goods that are traded, assuming that prices are constant and only 
exehange rates can fluctuate. World trade weights may provide a better 
approximation of the relevant combination of exehange rates than 
export weights in the case that exports are sold on world markets more 
than on national markets (see also section 4.3). 
Apart from the fact that trade shares are relatively easy to derive, 
their stability is also a positive factor. This reduces the ' bias 
resulting from the use of less recent data for the compilation of 
trade-weighted currency baskets. It also implies that once the weights 
have been determined, they are valid for some period. On the other 
hand, the assumptions made above with respect to the elasticities are 
more likely to be correct in the short run than in the longer run. 
In this section we have implicitly assumed that trade is denominated 
in the currency of either- the exporter pr the importer. It is also 
possible that a third currency is used as a denominator. In such a 
case a correction in the weighting stru'cture would be necessary. 
However, it is very difficult to determine exactly in which currency a 
trade-transaction is denominated. It may very well be that the curren-
cy in which a transaction is effected, is not the currency that really 
determines the price. As noted already in section 3.3 on SDR pegs, 
this is an argument for preferring trade-weighted baskets to baskets 
based on the currency denomination of trade. 
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(c) A group of former French colonies in Africa have linked their 
currencies, in most cases the CFA, to the French franc. 
(d) A considerable number of LDCs have adopted a more flexible 
arrangement. However, only 4 (high-income) LDCs went over to an 
independently floating exchange rate. The others preferred a 
managed floating rate or limited the flexibility of their 
currency in terms of a single Standard currency (dollar). 
(e) There has been an important shift from single currency pegs to 
currency basket pegs. At the end of 1983 more LDCs"had pegged 
their currency to a basket (36) than to the dollar (3*0 . This 
development from single currency pegs to currency basket pegs 
is even more pronounced when we consider the eombined market 
shares. LDCs that maintain a currency basket peg represent 
about 25 per cent of total LDC exports, while the export share 
of LDCs that maintain a single currency peg is only 15 per 
cent. 
3. In section three we analyzed the selection of an optimal exchange 
rate regime. The selection can be divided into three steps. First, 
a country must choose between a floating and a pegged exchange 
rate. The fundamental criterium is the (potential) stability of the 
exchange rate. There is no need to peg the exchange rate when we 
can expect a floating rate to be stable. Therefore, the characte-
ristics of a country that are relevant with respect to the choice 
between floating and pegging, all refer to the (potential) stabil-
ity of the floating rate. 
According to the main criteria (openness, degree of financial 
integration, market power and trade structure) LDCs should general-
ly peg their exchange rates. An additional argument is the cushion-
ing effect of international reserves in the case of real supply 
shocks. These theoretical considerations accord well with the 
situation in practice, as only a few relatively well-developed LDCs 
have adopted an independently floating exchange rate. 
H. However, pegging the exchange rate in a world of 'generalized 
floating' is not as easy as it was during the Bretton Woods era. 
There are two different alternatives: pegging to a single currency 
and pegging to a currency basket. In fact, these two categories are 
not disjunct, but single currency pegs can be regarded as a special 
case of currency basket pegs, in which all but one of the weights 
are equal to zero. In mathematical terms this means that the set of 
single currency pegs is a subset of the set of currency basket 
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pegs. This implies that optiraization of a target variable, which is 
• discussed in section 4, will generally result in a currency basket 
peg. Single pegs are mostly inferior from a purely theoretical 
point of view. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1983 52 LDCs had pegged their currency 
to a single Standard currency. . The main reason for maintaining a 
single currency peg refers to confidence. Pegging to a single 
strong (key) currency increases confidence in the local currency, 
which may stimulate international trade and investment in an 
indirect way. This is a long-term argument. On the other hand, 
pegging to the currency of a main trading partner will stimulate 
bilateral trade and investment between the two countries in a 
direct way, by reducing (exchange) rate uncertainty. 
An additional argument in favor of a single currency peg is that a 
fixed rate in terms of a single (key) currency will generally 
induce fixed rates in terms of a number of other currencies that 
are pegged to the same Standard currency. This argument is certain-
ly valid for pegs to the dollar and the French franc. 
5. With respect to basket pegs we must make a clear distinction 
between official basket pegs (e.g. SDR pegs) and individual basket 
pegs. In fact, an official basket peg combines certain character-
istics of a basket peg with characteristics of a single currency 
peg. It resembles a basket peg because the home-currency is not 
pegged to a single Standard currency but to a combination of 
currencies. However, the composition of this currency basket is not 
determined by the pegging country itself, but by an international 
institution. This implies that, from a purely theoretical point of 
view, an official basket will hardly ever be optimal for an 
individual country. 
iThe reasons for pegging to an official basket are, to some extent, 
'•similar to the reasons for choosing a single currency peg. In the 
first place, official baskets are well-known on financial markets 
and therefore an official basket peg promotes confidence in the 
local currency. Second, when different countries peg to the same 
official basket, their bilateral rates are fixed-, which may 
stimulate trade and investment, just as in the case of a single 
currency bloc. For instance, a common SDR peg among LDCs would 
certainly have a positive effect on intra-LDC trade. 
A third argument may be relevant in the future. If the SDR were to 
become more important on international trade and financial markets, 
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an SDR peg might lead to more stable export revenues for LDCs, 
while the (future) possibility of borrowing in SDRs might have the 
additional advantage of a debt that is stable in terms of the 
domestic currency. 
An additional argument for maintaining an SDR peg differs from the 
arguments in favour -of a single currency peg: an SDR peg will 
generally lead to a more stable trade-weighted effective exohange 
rate than a single currency.peg. 
6. Maintaining a basket peg is equivalent to the stabilization of an 
effective (average) exchange rate. It is necessary to emphasize 
that there is no such thing as the effective exchange rate. An 
effective exchange rate indicates the effect that the exchange 
rate exerts on a chosen variable, and every target variable 
corresponds to a different effective exchange rate. This implies 
that every basket peg corresponds to a target variable as we 1.1. 
7. Under a currency basket peg the connection between instument and 
target is not a direct one, but involves varlous intermediate 
relations. As currency baskets can not yet be used as a means of 
intervention, a basket peg can only be maintained after selection 
of an intervention currency. The effective exchange rate serves as 
an indicator that is determined by the instrument of the bilat-
eral rate between the home currency and the intervention currency. 
The final aim of exchange rate policy, e.g. the level of real 
income or employment, is often difficult to express directly in 
terms of the bilateral exchange rates. Therefore, an operational 
target variable is selected that is closely related to the final 
aim, and that can be written as a function of all bilateral ex-
change rates. 
8. With respect to exchange rate targets, it is useful to make a dis-
tinction between long term and short term targets. In the long run 
run the exchange rate should correspond to BOP equilibrium. This 
can be achieved best by adjustment of the peg in the case of a 
(potential) deficit or surplus. In this respect, the level of the 
peg is more important than the character of the peg. 
However, in the short run the main target of exchange rate policy 
is to take away the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the 
domestic economy. BOP deficits can be financed by using reserves 
and/or borrowing. Equilibrium on the BOP is not a proper short-term 
target. 
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Neither is the rate of inflation a proper target of exchange rate 
policy in the short run. The desired rate of inflation should not 
.determine the character of the peg, but only its level. An 
undesired rate of (imported) inflation can be cured by maintaining 
a orawling peg. This also implies that in the short run it is the 
nominal effective exchange rate which should be stabilized, and 
not the real effective exchange rate. 
Another target that is often mentioned in the literature on optimal 
basket pegs are the terms of trade. This target is connected with 
the final aim of a stable real income. However, apart from the 
question whether a stable real income is a proper aim, most LDCs 
are hardly able to influence their terms of trade. 
When internal equilibrium is the final aim, the internal terms of 
trade (i.e. the ratio of traded goods prices to non traded goods 
prices) are an acceptable target variable. Stable internal terms of 
trade prevent the occurence of sudden shifts in the allocation of 
resources in the case of exchange rate instability. 
In the literature on optimal basket pegs all the targets mentioned 
above have been- proposed. In most cases the result is a complex 
formula for the basket weights. These weights are, inter alia, 
based on elasticities, prices and variance/covariance matrices of 
exchange rates. Such weighting structures have two serious draw-
backs. First, the underlying data are generally not very stable and 
therefore regular basket adjustments will be necessary. In the 
second place, complex basket formulas imply a reduction in the 
predictability of the exchange rate, that may very well offset the 
theoretical advantages- of such a peg. This aspect is often neglect-
ed mainly because the capital account is not incorporated in most 
of the models. 
As an alternative for the optimal basket weights derived from well-
defined target variables, weights based on trade shares can be 
used. Becaus'e of the drawbacks associated with 'optimal' baskets 
and because of the frequent use of trade weights in exchange rate 
policy, trade-weighted basket pegs certainly deserve our attention 
as wéll. Pegging to a trade-weighted basket has a certain intuitive 
appeal: the more important the trade relations with a certain 
country, the closer the connection between the currency of the 
trading partner and the home currency. Under. rigid assumptions with 
respect to elasticities and prices, which are only probable to hold 
in the short run, the value of trade is stabilized by pegging to a 
trade-weighted basket. 
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The main advantages of trade weights in comparison to 'optimal' 
weights are that they can be derived simply and that they are 
relatively stable. Moreover financial markets will generally be 
more impressed by a trade-weighted basket peg than by a peg to a 
basket based on complicated theoretical formulas. This may explain 
the popularity of trade-weighted basket pegs among LDCs. 
Practically all LDCs in the category 'other composite pegs' have 
pegged their currency to a trade-weighted basket of the currencies 
of their major trading partners. In all of these cases the dollar 
is used as intervention currency. 
10.Little empirical research has been undertaken on the factors 
determining the selection of an exchange rate regime. The existing 
studies generally support the theoretical arguments. Our main 
observations in this respect are summarized below. 
a) The theoretical notion that in general LDCs should peg their 
exchange rate is amply justified by their behaviour in practice. 
Only a very small number of high-income LDCs have an indepen-
dently floating exchange rate. 
b) When an LDC decides to peg its exchange rate, it can choose 
between three alternatives: a single currency peg, an official 
basket peg and an individual basket peg. Theoretical consider— 
ations generally favour an individual basket peg. However, as we 
have concluded above, single currency pegs and SDR pegs have two 
advantages that individual basket pegs do not have. 
First, pegging to a single currency often implies fixed exchange 
rates in terms of a bloc of currencies, which may facilitate 
trade within such a bloc. This aspect is certainly relevant for 
the African countries that have pegged their currencies to the 
French franc (CFA-zone). However, also historical motives have 
played a role here, just as in the case of other non-dollar 
single currency pegs. 
A second and more important argument in favour of single cur-
rency pegs and official basket pegs (SDR pegs) is that such pegs 
increase confidence in the domestic currency. This argument is 
especially relevant for weak economies. Indeed, in practice we 
see that single currency pegs and SDR pegs are most popular 
among low and middle income LDCs. 
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c) With respect to individual, tailor-made basket pegs there is a 
certain distinction between practice and theory. In recent 
literature most authors compile baskets by optimizing or stabil-
izing a well-specified target variable. This often results in 
complex basket formulas and sometimes even in negative weights. 
However, in practice the majority of countries that maintain an 
individual basket peg prefer a simple trade-weighted currency 
basket. This supports our earlier argument in favour of trade--
weighted basket pegs. 
d) High-income oil exporting LDCs, for which on the basis of their 
economie power a floating rate would be feasible, have all 
pegged their currency in a more or less rigid way to the dollar. 
This preference for dollar pegs can be explained by the fact 
that their main export commodity, i.e.' oil, is priced in 
dollars. 
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APPENDIX 1 MARKET POWER 
A very clear explanation of the phenomenon 'market power'can be found 
in Branson and Katseli (1980). Starting from log-linear demand and 
supply equations they derive formulas for the domestic price level of 
exports and imports expressed as a function of the exchange rate and 
the domestic and foreign supply and demand conditions. The only para-
meters in these formulas are k in the export equation and k' in the 
import equation. 
If these parameters are equal to one, the price levels of exports and 
imports are completely determined by foreign market conditions and the 
exchange rate. Domestic market conditions are irrelevant in this case, 
which implies that the market power is minimal. On the other hand, if 
k and k' are equal to zero, this implies that the price levels are 
completely determined within the domestic economy, in which case the 
market power is maximal. Therefore, both k and k' are inverse indices 
of market power. Both indices are functions of demand and supply 
elasticities. The exact formulas are: 
for market power on the export side k: 
k = 1/(1-s /d ) with s (d )= price elasticity of export supply(demand) 
and s > 0 ; d i 0 ; 0 < k £ 1 ; 
x x 
and for market power on the import side: 
k'= 1/(1 —d /s ) with s (d )= price elasticity of import supply(demand) 
m m m m 
and s £ 0 ; d £ 0 ; 0 < k'< 1 . 
m m 
From these formulas it becomes clear that: 
1- The higher (lower) the elasticity of demand (supply) for (of) 
exports dx(sx), the higher k will be and therefore the lower 
the market power on the export side. 
2- The higher (lower) the elasticity of supply (demand) of (for) 
imports sm(dm), the higher k' will be and therefore the lower 
the market power on the import side. 
In general LDCs will have little market power. There are different 
ways to arrive at this conclusion. Crockett and Nsouli (1977) empha-
size the inelastie nature of the demand for imports and the supply of 
exports (p. 126). On the other hand, Branson and Katseli (1980, p. 56-
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57) and Black (1976, p. k) put emphasis on the high elasticities of 
the demand for exports and the supply of imports. However, both sets 
of assumptions lead to the same conclusion that LDCs wlll generally 
have little market power. We may add that, because in general exports 
of LDCs are less diversified than imports, market power is more likely 
to be on the export side than on the import side (k < k'). 
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APPENDIX 2 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF BASKET PEGS 
I List of symbols .,, 
II Assumptions and definitions with respect to absolute and 
relative basket pegs 72 
III Properties of basket pegs 75 
1. The choice of the intervention currency does not play 
any role in the character of basket pegs 75 
2. Maintaining an absolute basket peg is equivalent to 
stabilizing an effective exchange' rate 75 
3. Absolute and relative basket pegs are essentially 
different 76 
a) Under an absolute basket peg the numbers of curren-
cies in the basket are fixed but their weights 
depend on the (bilateral) exchange rates 76 
b) Only in the initial situation is the differentiated 
version of an absolute basket peg equal to the cor-
responding relative basket peg 78 
c) A relative basket peg is equivalent to a geometrical-
ly weighted basket peg in the levels of the exchange 
rates 78 
4. Under a relative basket peg a geometrie effective ex-
change rate is stabilized 79 
5. A three currency example 80 
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I List of symbols 
The subscript i(j) refers to country/currency i(j). In general the 
currency basket consists of the currencies 1 ... N, while the home 
currency carries the subscript 0 (zero); intervention takes place in 
currency N, which also functions as the numeraire currency. 
e... = exchange rate of currency i expressed in units of currency j 
ij 
at time t; 
n. = number of units (amounts) of currency i in the basket; 
w.. = weight of currency i in the basket to which currency j is 
Ji 
pegged at time t; 
w. = w . = weight of currency i in the home country's basket at 
time t; 
w. = w. = initial or desired weight of currency i in the home 
country's basket; 
exp(x) = e ; 
x = dx/x = dln x; 
N 
E x . = sum over i of the first N terms of x., excluding x, ; ï i k 
ik 
N 
n x. = product over i of the first N terms of x.; 
1 X X 
For exchange rates, the following relations hold true of all i,j,t: 
t _ t ~ 1 _ t t _ t 
ij Ji ' i k kj ij 
.t .t .t .t .t 
e. .. = - e. . ; e., + e. . = e. . 
ij ij ik kj ij 
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II Assum.ptions and definitions with respect to absolute and 
relative basket pegs 
To obtain a formula for a basket peg it is necessary to take a deci-
sion on: 
a) The initial value of the basket 
b) The weighting structure of the basket 
c) The intervention currency 
d) The character of the basket 
sub a) We will assume that the initial value of the basket is equal to 
the initial value of the home currency. If this is not the 
case, the home currency must first be brought at the right 
level before pegging it to a basket (e.g. by using a crawling 
peg formula) 
sub b) The desired weighting structure of the basket is given by 
N 
w. (i=1...N) with E w = 1 and w.S 0 for all i. 
sub c) With respect to the intervention currency there are two 
possibilities. This currency may or may not take part in the 
basket. In the first case it is given the subscript N and in 
the second case it carries the subscript N+1. As we will demon-
strate there is no fundamental difference between both cases 
and-therefore currency N will generally play the role of inter-
vention currency. 
sub d) In the case of an absolute basket peg, the value of the home 
currency is pegged to a basket of other currencies. A relative 
basket peg implies that the proportionate rate of change in the 
home currency's exchange rate is equal to a basket of propor-
tionate changes in the exchange rates of other currencies. 
We can now derive the formulas for absolute and relative basket pegs. 
In order to obtain the numbers n^ of currencies in the basket, we 
must multiply the weights by the initial exchange rates. 
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n. - w. . eQ. (1) 
This leads to the desired result, i.e. the value of the basket 
expressed in the home currency is now equal to onel): 
N N N 0 0 0 En.e.„ = E w.e„.e.rt = E w.= 1 1 10 1 01 10 ï 
When currency N, which takes part in the basket, is chosen as the 
intervention currency, the formula for an absolute basket peg 
becomes: 
t N t N_1 t 60N " = ni6iN " \ + J ViN (2) 
From this equation it becomes clear that, in order to maintain a 
basket peg, information is necessary about the exchange rates of the 
basket currencies in terms of the intervention currency. In the case 
the intervention currency is not represented in the basket, we obtain: 
t N t 
e0N+1= * ViN+1 ( 2 M 
The equations (2) and (2') are formulated in the levels of the 
exchange rates. A drawback of this method is that the numerical values 
of the exchange rates as well as the amounts of the currencies in the 
basket can show large differences. We can avoid this drawback by 
'rescaling the exchange rates. A common method is to divide the exchan-
ge rates by their initial values. When the absolute basket peg equa-
tion (2) is rescaled we obtain the following result: 
N N N t . 0 " t . 0 " 0 t . 0 " , t . 0 , ,.,,. 
e.../e.M = E n.e..,/e..t = E n.e..e..T/e... = E w. (e.../e.M) (2") ON ON l lN ON . 1 10 lN lN 1 ïN ïN 
We can also formulate a basket peg in relative terms, i.e. in first 
differences of the logaritms of exchange rates. For small values this 
can be regarded as a relation between the proportionate changes in the 
exchange rates. 
% • ; w i e iN = ; w i e iN ( 3 ) 1 1 
1) Flanders and Helpman (1979) do not choose numbers that have this 
property, but prefer to divide their numbers by the initial value 
of the basket in terms of the home currency, when they formulate 
their basket peg equation (p. 53^) - This clearly leads to 
equivalent results. 
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or, for a non-basket intervention currency: 
t N t 
ê0N+1 = ] ViN +1 ( 3 M 
We can rewrite equation (3) in the form: 
N 
. ^ Ü N ' 6 ^ • ] Wi • ln(eÏN/eiN) (3"} 
which is the log-linear functlon used by Lipschitz and Sundararajan 
(1980, p. 83). In (3) the weight wN has disappeared. However, 
because of the linear dependency of the weights 
N-1 
(w = 1 - E w.), no information is lost and there is no essential dif-
1 1 
ference between (3) and (3') in this respect. We will now derive some 
properties of absolute and relative basket pegs. 
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III Properties of basket pegs 
1. The choice of the intervention currency does not play any role 
in the character of the peg 
First we will show that any other currency may be substituted for the 
intervention currency N in the basket peg equation. Suppose we choose 
currency N-1 as our new intervention currency. The formula for an 
absolute basket peg now becomes: 
t t t
 r Ï t , t ; t 
60N-1 " 60N ' 6NN-1 " C * ni8iN; * 6NN-1 " * nieiN-1 k ' 
and, for a relative basket peg: 
N N N 
e0N-l" 60N + eNN-1= J Wi8iN + eNN-1= = Wi(eiN + 6NN-1)= * WieiN-1 (5) 
Equation (4) is equivalent to (2) and equation (5) is equivalent to 
(3). Exactly the same derivation can be used to demonstrate that the 
formulas for a non basket intervention currency are equivalent to the 
formulas for intervention currencies that take part in the basket. 
Instead of currency N-1 we must substitute currency N+1 as a numeraire 
in the equations presented above. Because of this equivalence and for 
the sake of simplicity, from now on we will assume that interventions 
take place in the basket currency N. 
i 
One assumption is crucial in the proof presented above, i.e. that the 
weights w^ or, equivalently, the amounts nj do not depend on the 
choice of the intervention currency. Especially when variances and 
covariances of exchange rates play a role in the determination of the 
exchange rates, this condition may very well not be fulfilled. 
2. Maintaining an absolute basket peg is equivalent to the stabi-
lization of an effective exchange rate 
An effective exchange rate is an average of the bilateral exchange 
rates of the home currency. Under an absolute basket peg the effective 
N
 t 
exchange rate that is kept constant is E n.e . 
N N N 
EER= E n.e^ = E n . e ^ - (E n . e ^ . e ^ = 1 (6) 
If the value of the basket is not equal to one unit of the home cur-
rency, but when e.g. the basket value is equal to b units of currency 
0 (which implies that the home currency is pegged to b_1 times the 
basket, see also footnote 1), the EER in equation (6) is equal to b. 
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Obviously, this still implies a constant EER. The EER can also be 
expressed in terms of the initial weights w^: 
EER= E n.e^ = I w.e°.e^ = E w.(ej0/e50) (6') 
3. Absolute and relative basket pegs are essentially different 
This difference will be demonstrated in three ways, viz. by proving 
three different (although related) propositions. 
(a) Under an absolute basket peg the numbers of currencies in the 
basket are fixed but their weights depend on the (bilateral) 
exchange rates. 
N 
Proof: w* = (nke^)/(Zn.eJN) = ( n ^ / e ^ - n ^ (8) 
Because the numbers n are fixed, w is dependent on the bilateral ex-
change rate between currency k and the home currency 0. In fact, this 
equation looks very much like equation (1). The difference between 
both equations lies in the direction of the causality. In (1), w^ is 
the exogenous variable that determines n^, while in the equation 
presented above, w is determined by the (exogenous) variable n and 
the exchange rate e . We can also express w in terms of the 
i n i t i a l weights 2)
 W[<i 
t t , t . 0 . 0 , t . 0 > , n . 
wk - Vko = \ - <eko/eko} • eko - wk-<eko/eko) ( 9 ) 
This equation makes clear that if currency k appreciates (depreciates) 
in terms of the home currency, the weight of currency k in the basket 
increases (decreases) proportionally. 
2)The initial weights are the weights on which the composition of the 
basket is based, i.e. the weights wj that determine the amounts 
n-L according to equation (1). In order to emphasize the 
predetermined character of the initial weights, we have omitted the 
superscript 0. However, it is clear that w.=w.. 
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It is also interesting to know what happens when currency k appre-
ciates or depreciates in terms of the numeraire currency N. Such an 
appreciation (depreciation) implies a uniform change against all other 
currencies in the basket. In the following equatlons thls proportio-
nate change equals a: 
e.,T = e.„ for 1=1.. .N and i*k, and ïN ï'N 
4 • 4 •0+a) 
We can now express w in terms of w and a: 
t , t , 0 , , t t , 0 , ,, , , 0 t
 w 0 
Wk - Wk (ekO/ekD) = Wk(ekNeNO/ekO} - Wk(1+a)-(ekN6NO)/ekO 
N 
" "k (1+a)'e0N/e0N = Wk(1+a)-eON/(^ V J N ) " 
N N 
"
 Wk ( 1 + a )- eoV (VkN + 'Z nieL)=Wk(1+a)-eüN/(nkekN(1+a)^ V Ï N ' 
*k *k 
r* ^ 0 ., 0 ., . 0 0 , , , . 0 . - 0 0 0. 
"
 Wk ( 1 + a )- e0N / ( nk ekN ( l + a ) + e0N _ V k N ) = Wk(1+a)'e0N/(nkek0e0Na+e0ll 
= wk(1+a)/(wka+1) (10) 
For small values of a, this can be approximated by: 
wk = w k( 1 + a - w k a) = w (1+a(1-w )) or wR - w = awk(1-w ) (11) 
This result shows that if currency k appreciates (depreciates) by a 
proportion a with respect to the numeraire and thereby with respect to 
all other currencies, its weight in the basket increases (decreases) 
by approximately aw^d-w^), which reaches its maximum value for 
wk= 0.5 (see figure A-1). It can easily be demonstrated that this 
result is also valid for groups of currencies that simultaneously 
appreciate or depreciate by the same percentage. In that case these 
currencies can be considered as one currency with a weight equal to 
the sum of the weights of the participating currencies. This also 
explains the symmetry of equation (11) around the value 0.5. If cur-
rency k appreciates (depreciates) by 100a per cent, this implies that 
all the other currencies depreciate (appreciate) by the same 100a per 
cent (on the assumption of a being relatively small). The increase 
(decrease) in the weight of currency k must be equal to the decrease 
(increase) in the aggregated weight of all other basket currencies. 
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Figure A-1 Change in basket weight 
of a currency that 
appreciates 
by p percent 
vk-wk 
^ - 7P/1W 
(b) Only in the initial situation is the differentiated version of 
an absolute basket peg equal to the corresponding relative basket 
peg equation 
Proof: Starting out from (2), we obtain the following equation for 
• t 
'ON* 
.t ... t t 
60N " d l n e0N " eN0 
N 
N N N 
t t t t t dl n.e.' = e.IO, E dn.e..T = e.r„. E n.de... 
. 1 ïN NO . 1 ïN NO , 1 ïN 
N N 
t ; t ,t t " o t .t " , t . o , .t 
e....E n.e..Tè..T = e.... E w.e.^e.^e.., = E (e.„/e.. )w.e.,t NO . 1 ïN ïN NO
 1 1 10 ïN ïN 10 10 l lN 
N 
r. t .t 
= E w. e.„ 
1 i i.N 
(12) 
Only in the initial situation is (12) equal to (3). Equation (3') can 
be derived from the differentiation of (2') in a completely similar 
way. Also this derivation is only valid in the initial situation. 
(c) A relative basket peg is equivalent to a geometrically weighted 
basket in the levels of the exchange rates 
Proof: Integration of (3) yields the following result 
N 
e0N = e X p U n e0N) = e X p ( / êoV = e X p ( / Z WiêiN} = e x P ( / d E w i l n e Ï N ) 
N N 
= exp(E wiln e i N + c ) = exp(cQ) . n exp(wiln e i N) 
" °1 ] ^iN5 " °1 = ««W (13) 
with c = In c = constant of integration. 
7 9 
We can determine c-| by substitution of the initial values of the 
exchange rates in equation (13). 
N-1 w. 
°1 - 4 ' \ <e?N> ' (14) 
When we substitute (14) in (13) and rearrange the terms, we obtain the 
following equation: 
fc
 / ° N(^1) r t , o "i •
 r _ 
80N 7 60N " \ (elN/eiN) (15) 
This equation is equivalent to the log-linear formula (3''). 
The linear equation (2) and the multiplicative equation (13) are 
equivalent only when the exchange rates e. are close to the initial 
values e. . The difference between both equations is most striking 
when one of the exchange rates e.w becomes zero. Such a situation may 
occur (theoretically) in the case of hyperinflation in country i. 
According to (13) e would also become zero, while according to 
t 0 
equation (2) e „ would fall by the amount n.e in comparison to the 
initial value. 
There is only one case in which an absolute and a relative basket peg 
are completely identical, i.e. in the case of a 'degenerated' basket 
consisting of only one currency. We then have a single currency peg, 
with only one weight, which is equal to one. The equations for a 
single currency peg are: 
t 0 .
 n „.. .t 
eoi = eoi or' equivalently e0i = ° 
4. Under a relative basket peg a geometrie effective exchange 
rate is stabilized 
We will first demonstrate that under a relative basket peg a weighted 
average of the proportionate changes in the exchange rate is stabil-
ized. 
N N N f
 t N 
E w.e.0 = E w.(e.N+ e^) = E w.e.N + eN0 = E w.e^- eN0 = 0 (16) 
Only in the initial situation is the proportional change in the EER 
N
 t 
equal to the weighted average E w-e.n presented above. The reason is 
that the weights of the currencies in the EER, which are equivalent to 
the weights in the (absolute) basket, are not constant (see 4-a). 
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As we have seen in 4-e a relative basket peg can be considered as an 
absolute basket peg with a geometrie structure. When we now define our 
geometrie effective exchange rate (GEER) as 
N w. 
GEER=n (ej0/e;o) \ 
the proposition above can easily be proved by using (15) 
N w. N . w. w. 
GEER = E (ej0/e°0) K n ( e ^ ) ^ / e ^ ) l-
=
 (e0N/e00N)_1 =< eÏN/e?N)Wi= 1 ( 1 7 ) 
GEERs, though at first sight certainly less appealing than (arith-
matic) EERs, have an important property that EERs must lack. A propor-
tionate change in one of the exchange rates always has the same (pro-
portionate) effect on the GEER. 
5 A three currency example 
Let us assume that there are three currencies: HFL, BFR and DM. The 
home currency 0 (HFL) is pegged to a basket consisting of the 
currencies 1 (BFR) and 2 (DM), of which the latter acts as the 
intervention currency. The following table of initial exchange rates 
is given. 
Table A Initial exchange rates 
e°. j=0 (HFL) j=1 (BFR) j=2 (DM) 
i=0 (HFL) 1 20 • • 0.8 
i=1 (BFR) 0.05 1 0.04 
i=2 (DM) 1.25 25 1 
The desired weighting structure is: w-j = weight of BFR =0.3 ; 
w2 = weight of DM = 0.7 . 
The numbers in the absolute basket can now be derived: 
ni = wieoi = (0-3)-20 = 6 ; n 2 = w2eo2 = (0-7)- °-8 = °-56 ; 
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This implies that the basket consists of 6 units of BFR and 0.56 units 
of DM. The absolute basket peg equation now becomes: 
SHFL/DM = 6eBFR/DM + ° - 5 6 " 
With the result that the corresponding effective exchange rate equals 
one: EER = 6eJ F R / H F L • O . S Ö e J ^ = 1. 
We now turn to the relative basket peg equation. Substitution in (3) 
g i V 6 S : êHFL/DM = °-3 êBFR/DM ; 
with the result that 0.3 êg F R / H F L +0.7 *SM/HFL" ° ' 
As we have seen in equation (13) a relative basket peg can also be 
written as a geometrically weighted absolute basket peg. 
t , t ,0.3 .
 t h / 0 ,,, 0 . 1 
HFL/DM = CreBFR/DMJ * C1 " ^HFL/DM;A6BFR/DM; = 
- 0.8/(0.OM)0,3 . 2.1 . 
We can now also give the formula for the geometrie effective exchange 
rate (see (17)). 
GEER
 " ^ F R / H F l / ' 3 • ( eDM/HFL )0 '7- 2 " 1 = 1 
Without further comment we will now give the formulas for the case of 
a non-basket intervention currency ($): 
absolute basket peg: eJ p L / $ - 6 e^ p R / $ + 0.56 eJM/$ ; 
relative basket peg: êJ p L / $ = 0. 3ê^ R / $ + 0.7 êJM/$ . 
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